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ABSTRACT 
As a social species, correct emotional perception is so vital, that the 
human brain has evolved a mechanism to control attentional choices by exerting 
a narrowed field of perception during danger, called the scope of attention (SoA). 
The SoA determines what information will be focused on or  ignored by blocking 
the perception of non-relevant items and increasing selective focus on danger; 
even if danger is merely a sad-face. The emotional items blocked from 
perception cannot be remembered because they were never perceived. But, 
attention-control to emotional stimuli also varies with mood, as seen in mood-
disorders. A mood-disorder’s effect upon the SoA has not been extensively 
studied, and no investigations examining the SoA in mood-disorders versus 
healthy individuals could be found in the literature. Thus, this thesis considers the 
question: Do mood disorders affect the SoA during emotional interactions? To 
investigate this, we evaluated individual differences in the SoA for those with or 
without mood-disorder symptomology, during visual processing of emotionally-
salient stimuli. We measured the responses to emotionally-salient distracting 
faces near to, and far from, the target face. Results indicated that the state 
anxiety group identified target emotions more slowly than did healthy individuals. 
In addition, those with state anxiety had a comparable SoA to healthy individuals, 
except while viewing a sad target with sad, far away distractors. This negative 
environment broadened the state groups SOA, instead of narrowing it. Thus, the 
state anxiety group perceived an overabundance of negative emotional content 
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from the surrounding faces. Depression and trait anxiety groups SoAs were 
comparable to healthy controls during sad targets, but not happy. The scope of 
attention for those with depression and trait anxiety narrowed when the target 
was a happy face and the distracting faces were in close proximity to the target. 
Thus, the depression and trait anxiety groups did not perceive the emotional 
content of the surrounding faces. These results suggest that state anxiolytics are 
relatively slower in responding to emotional information in a facial stimulus, but 
once they identify the face as happy at close range, they achieve the same, 
broad, scope of attention as healthy individuals. However, state anxiolytics are 
particularly affected when negative emotional items are experienced with, distant, 
negative surrounding emotions.  By contrast, once depressives and trait 
anxiolytics identify a positive emotional expression, they are restricted in their 
ability to recognize contrasting or changing expressions in individuals who are in 
close proximity to their focus of attention. Therefore, individuals with high trait 
anxiety or depression have a relatively narrower SoA, restricting their perception 
of close-range emotional-interactions, and those with state anxiety have a 
relatively broader SoA, enhancing their perception of distant, negative, emotional 
interactions. The present findings indicate that individuals with mood disorders 
process emotional information differently than healthy individuals.  
Keywords:  depression, mood-disorder, scope of attention, state anxiety, 
trait anxiety, perception.  
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CHAPTER ONE: 
MOOD AND THE SCOPE OF ATTENTION 
 
Choosing what to focus on, and what to ignore, affects the human 
perception of life; but so does one’s mood. For most humans, mood can become 
more intense during emotional interactions. But emotions are transient, and if a 
low or high mood arises, it does not significantly affect the human perception of 
life negatively. But, for some, high mood-states are long-term, and cause 
negative behavioral, perceptual, and physiological consequences. Herein, we 
compare healthy individuals to those with mood pathology to ascertain if 
differences in the range or scope of attention affect the perception of the 
emotional world.  
Disorders of Mood and Control of Attention 
The World Health Organization (2017) estimates 264 million people, 
globally, will experience clinical levels (i.e., high, sustained or reoccurring 
impairment with measurable symptomology) of depression, and  284 million will 
experience an anxiety disorder. It is common to have more than one mood-
disorder at a time (Lamers, et al., 2019; Langer et al., 2019). An estimated 85% 
of those who suffer mood-disorders reported serious to moderate impairment in 
daily functioning including attention deficits (World Health Organization, 2017). 
Stressful situations (i.e., test, evaluative, or competitive conditions; see Eysenck, 
1992, for a review), trigger the worrying common to mood-disorders. Yet, it is 
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common to find that individuals who choose to be in a highly attention-dependent 
environment (e.g., university student populations) have high percentages of 
anxiety and depression (Beiter, et al., 2015; Latiff, & Aszahari, 2014; Mahmoud, 
Staten, Hall, & Lennie, 2012). This seems counterintuitive as mood-disorders are 
defined as ‘disorders of attention’ (Psychological Association Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual, 2013), and one would hypothesize that individuals prone to 
these disorders would gravitate to less stressful surroundings to increase their 
chances of survival in these environments. However, this is not the case. 
Attention and Survival 
Attention is the ability to select the information that one wishes to identify, 
or focus on (Ahmed, & de Fockert, 2012; Bartés-Serrallonga et al., 2014; 
Haladjian, & Montemayor, 2015; Lupytan, 2015; Mack & Clarke, 2012; Moore & 
Zirnsak, 2017; Wolf et al., 2018; Wolf & Pfeiffer, 2014). Attention can concern a 
single sensory source (e.g., something seen, but not heard, or felt) or can be 
distributed among several information sources (Kolb, & Whishaw, 2015; Stone, 
2012; Wright, &Ward, 2008). The focus of attention can be internal (i.e., 
thoughts), or external (i.e., environmental stimuli) (Chun, Golomb, & Turk-
Browne, 2011). For the mechanism of attentional control to respond to the 
environment effectively, the brain must have the capacity to focus on certain 
stimuli to the exclusion of others. The brain’s ability to discriminate stimuli is 
called selective attention, (Ahmed, & de Fockert, 2012; Ku, 2018; Moore & 
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Zirnsak, 2017; to name a few). The brain regulates what information is processed 
by a mechanism called attentional control (Figure 1).  
 
 
Figure 1. Basic Attention Control.    
For 5 seconds, look for the ‘X’ on both sides of the image above. Attentional 
control mechanisms are utilized in processing both the left and right sides .  The 
left requires less neural energy to focus on X; the right requires more. The left 
requires less ability to ignore non-relevant information (i.e., things that were not 
the X); the right requires more ability to ignore irrelevant information.  
 
 
Attentional control allows an increase or decrease in the scope of the 
visual field based on the perceived survival relevance of a stimulus (Kolb, & 
Whishaw, 2015; Stöttinger, & Perner, 2006). This adaptive mechanism exerts a 
higher degree of control over what information is processed including emotional 
interactions, allowing exclusion of elements distracting from the current survival 
needs (Figure 2).  
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Figure 2. Survival Attention Control.  
As dangerous stimuli get physically closer (left), attention control increases, to 
increase the chance of survival. Vision narrows to focus all attentional resources 
on the danger (i.e., items perceived as negative; the bear). The danger is given 
‘attentional priority’. Items perceived as ‘not as dangerous’ (e.g., bunnies, trees), 
or less likely to cause harm (i.e., farther away) are excluded from sight and 
perception (right) (Clipart Library, 2019). 
 
 
Interestingly, those with clinical level depression (Dai, & Feng, 2011; Dai, 
Feng, & Koster, 2011) or anxiety (Berggren, Blonievsky, & Derakshan, 2015) 
experience decreased attentional control.  
Attention’s Scope and Perception 
Attentional control ignores distractions by enabling the brain to focus 
neural resources (i.e., use selective attention) on specific stimuli which fall within 
certain visually perceivable distances, or ranges, called the scope of attention 
(Bartés-Serrallonga et al., 2014; Chen, Marshall, Weidner, & Fink, 2009; 
Haladjian, & Montemayor, 2015; Moore & Zirnsak, 2017; Rowe, Hirsh, & 
 
5 
 
Anderson, 2007; Wolf et al., 2018; Wolf & Pfeiffer, 2014). The scope of attention 
limits how much of the visual field surrounding the target stimulus will be 
perceived.  A broad scope of attention allows more information to be perceived, 
and a narrow scope of attention allows fewer items to be perceived. Therefore, 
the scope of attention regulates human visual perception (Figure 3). 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Broad and Narrow Scope of Attention.  
Attentional control responds to emotional stimuli by either broadening or 
narrowing the scope of attention’s range. This allows only survival relevant 
information to be perceived (i.e., white area inside gray circles). Gray circle = 
scope of attention, Broad = advantageous if no threat exists, Narrow = 
advantageous if threat exists. Items outside the circles (in light gray) cannot be 
perceived.  
 
 
Perception and Social Interactions 
To become aware of something through the human senses (e.g., visual 
and/or auditory and/or tactile), is called perception (Coon, & Mitterer, 2008; 
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Gregory, 1970; 1974; 1987; 1997; 2006; 2008; Haladjian, & Montemayor, 2015; 
Kolb, & Whishaw, 2015; Nichols, Brett, Andersson, Wager, & Poline, 2005; 
Pomerantz, 2003; Smith, Seger, & Mackie, 2007; Snyder, 2015). Herein, we will 
evaluate visual sensory perception.  
Perception obviously includes social interactions (i.e., reoccurring contact 
with other humans; Boyd, & Richerson, 2009) which are vital to human survival 
(Coon, & Mitterer, 2008; Smith, Seger, & Mackie, 2007). But, how much we 
perceive of the world is directly related to the range of our scope of attention at 
the time of the experience (Figure 3). Therefore, over the course of human 
evolution, perception-related social attention allowed humans to become more 
adept at identifying (Stone, 2012; Whishaw, 2015), categorizing (Montemayor, & 
Haladjian, 2015), and selecting pertinent aspects of their social environment, 
thus increasing the chances of human personal and group/social survival 
(Brosch, Pourtois, Sander, & Vuilleumier, 2011; Graziano, 2014; Sander, & 
Vuilleumier, 2011). The identified and categorized information perceived by the 
individual must then be stored in the brain through a process called memory  
(Ahmed, & de Fockert, 2012; Amso & Scerif, 2015; Bartés-Serrallonga et al., 
2014; Chun, Golomb,& Turk-Browne, 2011; Coon, & Mitterer, 2008; Haladjian, & 
Montemayor, 2015; Ku, 2018).  
Information not perceived cannot be moved to memory (Heurley, & 
Ferrier, 2015; Martin, 1992; Mitterer, Horschig, Müsseler, & Majid, 2009). The 
human brain uses the items that can be perceived through visual attention, and 
 
7 
 
stored within memory, to construct an active, neural-processed map of the world 
(Coon, & Mitterer, 2008; Gregory, 1970, 1974, 1987, 1997, 2006, 2008; 
Haladjian, & Montemayor, 2015). Therefore, what humans are able to perceive 
through their current scope of attention, at any given moment, becomes their 
individual map of ‘life’. 
Perception’s Cyclic Nature 
This perceived map of one’s life is strongly influenced by previous 
experiences (Ku, 2018; Schacter, Gilbert, & Wegner, 2011; Snyder, 2015; Stone, 
2012). All experiences are cyclically utilized. That is, new experiences are 
interpreted in terms of past experiences, then stored in memory, and eventually 
utilized in the perception of future experiences. This influences the perceived 
probability (i.e., degree of belief; Gregory, 2006) that an event will occur 
(Gregory, 2008) during current or future interactions within the physical and 
social environment (i.e., if, each time you saw a sad-faced person, someone 
pinched your arm, then seeing a sad face may make you predict it is prudent to 
cover your arms, move away, or prepare for pain),  This cyclic perceptional 
process (Friston, 2010; Tishby, & Polani, 2011) is a favorable, adaptive social-
interaction mechanism (Barrett, 2017) as it allows constant data reevaluation.  
The ability to cycle information allows the brain to process information 
differently depending upon whether or not that stimuli resemble previous 
experiences (i.e., whether the item has been seen before; repetition). The cycling 
mechanism also allows humans to make decisions about future events by 
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comparing newly perceived items to items in memory. The brain deems these 
items as ‘similar to’ (i.e., congruent), or ‘different from’ (i.e., incongruent) 
previously experienced stimuli (Bruner, & Postman, 2006; Schmidt, Notebaert, & 
Van Den Bussche, 2015; Snyder, 2015). Cycling shows the brains perceptual 
attention mechanisms are constantly adapting (Coon, & Mitterer, 2008; 
Haladjian, & Montemayor, 2015; Nieuwenhuis, et al., 2006) to allow the most 
advantageous interpersonal and social interactions possible.  
Perception’s Neural Connection to Mood  
The monitoring areas of the brain that allow humans to decipher social 
environments share neuro-anatomy with the regions utilized in emotion, 
emotional stimuli evaluation, and internal mood (Bas-Hoogendam, van 
Steenbergen, Tissier, van der Wee, & Westenberg, 2019; Izard, 2010; Kolb, & 
Whishaw, 2015; Schulze, Schulze, Renneberg, Schmahl, & Niedtfeld, 2019). 
This allows internal mood to interact with the perception of any social interaction, 
to affect and be affected by decision making or emotions (Schnyer et al., 2015), 
and to modify external factors, such as the perceived emotionality of 
environmental stimuli (Barratt & Bundesen, 2012; Diéguez-Risco, Aguado, 
Albert, & Hinojosa, 2015; Kanske, & Kotz, 2011). Together, these common brain 
areas connect perception of social-emotional interactions to mood-state (Barrett, 
2017). 
During social perception, the human brain uses the repeated or cyclic 
observation-process to make ‘informed decisions’ about where a conversation is 
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leading (Snyder, 2015), or what threat level is present when approaching another 
human (Haladjian, & Montemayor, 2015; Pomerantz, 2003). The brain utilizes the 
human face to perceive the current emotional state or overall mood of another 
human being, even without the presence of spoken language (Kolb, & Whishaw, 
2015; Stone, 2012). This non-verbal emotional communication is so important to 
human social survival that social-emotional perception is supported by neural 
circuitry designed for the task of face recognition and facial expression 
identification (Barrett, 2017; Mumenthaler, 2012; Xie, & Zhang, 2016). These 
responses to the emotional world are affected by their congruency with the 
individual’s past experience (Gilbert & Li, 2013; Haladjian, & Montemayor, 2015; 
Jensen et al., 2015) and the individual’s internal mood-state (Coon, & Mitterer, 
2008). Basically, humans are hard-wired to decipher other human’s emotional-
mood state quickly and efficiently, and then make decisions about the person’s 
future approachability.   
Perception of Social Harm to the Self 
In the presence or absence of potential social (or physiological) harm, 
attentional control uses the scope of attention like a cage, or bubble, to visually 
scale the amount of environmental information which can be observed (Öhman, 
2000; Öhman, & Mineka, 2001; Olsson, & Phelps, 2007) (Figure 3). It is 
important to note that whether the perceived social harm is psychological or 
physiological, the scope of attention responds to the emotional strength (i.e., 
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salience), and perceived ‘good-ness’ or ‘bad-ness’ (valence) of the stimuli 
(Barratt, & Bundesen, 2012; Chen, Marshall, Weidner, & Fink, 2009). In healthy 
adults, the scope of attention narrows the range of items which can be perceived 
when negative emotional stimuli replace neutral or positive stimuli. (Bartés-
Serrallonga et al., 2014; Haladjian, & Montemayor, 2015; Moore & Zirnsak, 2017; 
Rowe, Hirsh, & Anderson, 2007; Wolf et al., 2018; Wolf & Pfeiffer, 2014) (Figure 
4). 
 
 
Figure 4. Perceived Emotionality’s Effect on the Scope of Attention.  
The perceived ‘goodness’ or ‘badness’ of stimuli triggers the scope of attention to 
respond. In healthy participants, the scope narrows to negative stimuli and 
broadens to positive stimuli. Gray circle represents the scope of attention. Target 
(i.e., center image in circle) (O’Donnell, & Koshino, 2017). 
 
Social Transmission of Mood 
In social interactions, attention-resources are highly focused on the short-
lived feelings (i.e., emotions) of others. Perceived or experienced emotions can 
produce changes in mood. Moods are defined as having no clear starting or 
‘formation’ point (Izard, 2010), but a person’s mood-state is innately perceivable 
by other humans (Eldar, Rutledge, Dolan, & Niv, 2016; Eldar et al., 2016). This 
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suggests that mood is socially-transmittable. Research shows that mood also 
affects internal information processing. For example, when a person is in a 
positive mood, and then encounters someone in a negative mood, a mood-
change occurs in response (Rey, et al., 2014). Interestingly, this change occurs 
before the human brain has time to rationally evaluate if a mood-change is 
preferable (Bas-Hoogendam, et al, 2018; Bas-Hoogendam, et al., 2019). 
This social transmission of mood allows one human to evaluate another 
human’s level of, or need for, social interaction or support, while reinforcing 
information regarding danger level (Bishop, Duncan, Brett, & Lawrence, 2004; 
Bunford, Kinney, Michael, & Klumpp, 2017; Burkhouse et al., 2018; Burklund, 
Torre, Lieberman, Taylor, & Craske, 2017; Öhman, 2005). These aspects make 
the social transmission of mood a way to translate the human emotional-state, 
and our ‘emotional need’, to others in our vicinity. Therefore, the social 
transmission of mood is a survival-based adaptation to foster intra-social support 
and functioning (Bas-Hoogendam et al., 2019; Graziano, 2014); again, increasing 
the groups likelihood of survival. 
Mood, Emotion, and Congruency 
The human ability to visually decipher others external emotional states 
also influences survival ability. Once the external emotion is perceived, the 
internal emotional response deploys a different amount of attention to stimuli 
dependent upon the stimuli’s emotion-type (i.e., happy; positive, sad; negative) 
(Amso & Scerif, 2015). As we know, emotion affects mood, and mood can be 
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transferred. The transference of these moods affects others’ emotional-
responses and behavior. Positive mood enhances performance tasks (Rowe, 
Hirsh, Anderson, 2007); which could lead to more efficient academic or social 
functioning. Negative mood affects the judgment and the perception of objects 
and events (Snyder, 2015); which can lead to problems in social relationships.  
Congruency (i.e., the sameness or difference in something compared to 
what you already have experienced) also interacts with mood. Niedenthal and 
Setterland (1994) found that individuals have a heightened perception for things 
that are congruent with (i.e., the same as) their current mood. But humans 
cannot obscure mood-state as easily as their emotional state (Barrett, 2017). Not 
being able to obscure one’s mood state could be advantageous socially, allowing 
others to respond, or it could be disadvantageous psychologically, as an 
individual’s level and type of mood is closely tied to their sense of emotional well-
being. This has been well-studied in individuals with high mood levels of anxiety 
(Picó-Pérez, Radua, Steward, Menchón, & Soriano-Mas, 2017) and/or 
depression (Anand et al., 2005; Yin, Hou, Wang, Sui, & Yuan, 2015).  
Since the emotional value of stimuli affects the human scope of attention, 
and there is a preference for things that are congruent to one’s mood state, a 
disorder of mood could exert significant control over one’s perception of the 
world.  
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Mood: Transient and Non-transient 
Healthy individuals have transient (or short-duration) high-moods (i.e., one 
anticipates going to a concert of their favorite band, which results in a sustained 
high, positive mood for the week before) and transient low-mood (i.e., a 
cherished family pet dies and a low, negative mood may be sustained for weeks). 
Furthermore, transient mood-states can last for extended periods without being a 
maladaptive pattern (i.e. pathologic) (Bishop, et al., 2004; Burkhouse et al., 
2018). Non-transient (i.e., long-lasting) mood-states (e.g., as in high anxiety or 
high depression) cannot generally be related to a specific cause. Anxiolytic or 
depressed mood decreases the likelihood of positive social interactions (Anxiety: 
Picó-Pérez, Radua, Steward, Menchón, & Soriano-Mas, 2017; Depression: 
Anand et al., 2005; Yin, Hou, Wang, Sui, & Yuan, 2015). 
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CHAPTER TWO: 
MOOD, THE BRAIN, AND BEHAVIOR 
Attention Control in the Brain 
The neurological ‘circuitry’ underlying attentional controls (e.g., attention, 
selective attention, scope of attention, stimuli congruency) is vast (Baluch & Itti, 
2011; Moore & Zirnsak, 2017; Wolf et al., 2018). These neural circuitries serve 
the human brain’s need to intricately decipher, evaluate, and hypothesize about 
(Gregory, 1980) environmental information. However, one’s mood-state also 
affects what an individual hypothesizes to be ‘true’ (i.e., how humans 
think/perceive reality), how their bodies function (Gohd, 2017; Kolb, & Whishaw, 
2015), and how they respond to their environment (Shackman, Salomons, 
Slagter, Fox, Winter, & Davidson, 2011).  
Mood and the Cingulate Cortex 
What humans visually attend to (i.e., focus on) are stimuli, and as we have 
noted, stimuli’s emotion type causes specific changes in the amount of items (or 
data) the human brain will allow to be attended to (e.g., the scope of attention 
changes). Visual attention to emotional stimuli is accomplished by the anterior 
and mid-cingulate cortex (ACC and MCC, respectively; Bush, Luu, & Posner, 
2000; Chen, Marshall, Weidner, & Fink, 2009; Etkin, Egner, & Kalisch, 2011; 
Haladjian, & Montemayor, 2015; Hall, 2011) (Figure 5). 
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Figure 5. Emotional Attention in the Brain: Rostral Cingulate Cortex. 
(Left) Anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) and adjoining mid-cingulate cortex (MCC) 
are highlighted in yellow (Hall, 2011). (Right) Cognitive control (i.e., making 
decisions) is accomplished by the mid-cingulate (aMCC: green) and posterior-
cingulate (pMCC: red). The affective (i.e., emotionally-linked) division is the 
pregenual (pgACC: orange) and subgenual (sgACC: blue). These adjoining 
locations allow the ACC/MCC to access thought, emotion (including fear via 
amygdalae), and mood related input (Adapted from: Bush, Luu, & Posner, 2000). 
 
 
Subtle, rapid cognitive-emotional changes can be assessed by the 
ACC/MCCs monitoring ability (e.g., interpretation of facial expressions, body 
posture, and verbal tone). These changes can be measured through 
neuroimaging (Panksepp & Biven, 2012; Harmon-Jones, Harmon-Jones, & Price, 
2013). Higher mood scorers have significantly higher or lower neural excitation 
(i.e., chemical electrical ‘firing’ of neurons) in one brain region, or between 
multiple regions (i.e., in functionally connected brain areas; Kolb, & Whishaw, 
2015) when responding to an object (generally appearing on a monitor screen, 
as in the experiment, herein).  
Labuschagne, and colleges (2012) found higher ACC activation (i.e. more 
utilization of neural resources) in anxiety sufferers than in healthy controls during 
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the viewing of emotionally negative stimuli (Berggren, et al, 2015; Berggren & 
Derakshan, 2013). In depressives, Miskowiak et al. (2015) found that both high-
risk adult twins (i.e., one twin with clinical depression history, one without) 
showed increased neural response to happy and fearful faces in the dorsal ACC 
and displayed increased attention vigilance for fearful faces, compared to low-
risk twins (i.e., neither twin had a history if depression) (also see Bodenschatz, 
Skopinceva, Kersting, Quirin, & Suslow, 2018 regarding sad face responses in 
depressives).  
Socially, the ACC/MCC allows for an understanding of another person’s 
internal mood alterations, and gives information about the probability of external 
aggressiveness or kindness (Shackman, Salomons, Slagter, Fox, Winter, & 
Davidson, 2011). The ACC/MCC also monitors emotion-related or ‘affective’ 
conflicts or congruencies (i.e., like seeing a happy friend surrounded by sad 
friends; ☺). But when the ACC is unable to properly process incoming data, a 
maladaptive loop of emotional distress is created (Polli, et al., 2005), which 
drains attentional resources (Wei, Szameitat, Müller, Schubert, & Zhou, 2013). 
This attentional resource drain, inherent to mood-related emotional processing, 
has been known to affect the rate of neural processing (i.e., creating slower 
reaction times to stimuli) and thus is evidenced in behaviors. 
Mood-disorders and Behavior 
Behaviorally, mood disorders (e.g., anxiety, depression) share 
symptomology, making them hard to differentiate (i.e., those with depression and 
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anxiolytic disorders experience cyclic thought patterns; Psychological Association 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual, 2013; Schulze, Schulze, Renneberg, Schmahl, 
& Niedtfeld, 2019; World Health Organization, 2017). The occurrence of mood-
disorder comorbidity is high (depression is often accompanied by anxiety, and 
vice-versa; Lamers, et al., 2019; Langer et al., 2019). This may explain mood-
disorder overlaps in symptomology. These factors can create research 
confounds, but it remains the case that the unique behavioral effects of the 
different mood disorders have been demonstrated in human subjects 
(Arbabshirani, et al., 2017; Woo, Chang, Lindquist, & Wager, 2017) even in the 
presence of mood-comorbidities (Spielberger, et, al., 1983; Vitasari, et al., 2011; 
Yang, et al., 2016). Herein, we will investigate whether high mood, human 
participants, with mood-disorder comorbidities exhibit unique or differential 
behavioral effects than controls, by using an attention task which has been 
shown to engage the scope of attention in healthy subjects. 
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CHAPTER THREE: 
MOOD MEASUREMENT: TASK AND THEORY 
The Flanker Task 
One of the best-known measurements of attention is the flanker task 
(Ericksen and Erickson, 1974; Eriksen, & Schultz, 1979; Eriksen, & Spencer, 
1969; Schmidt, & De Houwer, 2011; Wendt,& Luna-Rodriguez, 2009) . The 
flanker task has been shown to be effective in a large range of experimental 
paradigms, such as during stimuli sequences (Schmidt, & De Houwer, 2011; 
Nieuwenhuis, et al., 2006; Wendt, & Luna-Rodriguez, 2009),with emotional 
stimuli (Barratt & Bundesen, 2012; Fenske, & Eastwood, 2003), and during the 
use of electrophysiology/neuro-imaging (Purmann, Badd, Luna-Rodriguez, & 
Wendt, 2010; Ullsperger, & von Cramon, 2001; Lamers, et al., 2019).  
During the flanker task, participants respond to a centered target stimulus 
which is ‘flanked’ or surrounded by distractor stimuli on either side (Eriksen, & 
Eriksen, 1974; Eriksen, & Schultz, 1979). The flankers may be the same as the 
target (congruent; → → →) or different from the target (incongruent;  → ). 
Human neuro-imaging and computationally modeled data have shown congruent 
trials produce less neuronal excitation than incongruent trials (Kinoshita et al., 
2011). When the mean response on incongruent trials is significantly longer (i.e., 
slower) than the mean response on congruent trials, it is known as a congruency 
effect (Barratt & Bundesen, 2012; Eriksen, & Eriksen, 1974; Janczyk, & Ulrich, 
2019) (Table 1). 
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Table 1. Effect Calculations  
 
 
The flanker task has the capacity to assess the participant’s inhibitory 
processes (i.e., the individual’s ability to ignore irrelevant data) during responses 
to the target which is in the presence of a distractor. The measurement of these 
inhibitory processes allows the breath of the scope of attention to be calculated 
via the attentional scope effect (Table 1). This makes the flanker task especially 
suited for the emotion-based attentional scope experimentation, herein. 
Effects of Stimuli and Distractors 
In addition to congruency, there are several other well-established effects 
with the flanker task and some of these interact with congruency (Eriksen, & 
Eriksen, 1974). These include effects based in the nature of the target stimulus 
(e.g., target effects; Table 1).Target effects occur where one target takes longer 
to respond to than another (Eriksen, & Eriksen, 1974; Eriksen, & Schultz, 1979; 
Neumann, & DeSchepper, 1991; Li, Miller, & Desimone, 1993). Research using 
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emotional stimuli (Fenske, & Eastwood, 2003) have demonstrated target effects 
based in the valence (i.e., positive emotion vs. negative emotion) of the target. 
Reaction time is generally longer for negative emotional stimuli.  
An effect can also be seen in the location of the distractor in reference to 
the target’s location: called a distance effect (Table 1) (Eriksen, & Eriksen, 1974; 
Hübner, & Töbel, 2019; Mattler, 2006; Miller, 1991; Olk, Dinu, Zielinski, & 
Kopper, 2018). A distance effect occurs when distractors which are farther away 
from the target are responded to more slowly than distractors which are located 
closer to the target. Distance effects are common and can be helpful in the 
measurement and confirmation of scope of attention changes when comparing 
one target-type or distractor-type to another (Ahmed, & de Fockert, 2012; 
Hübner, & Töbel, 2019; Rowe, Hirsh, & Anderson, 2007).  
An attentional scope effect (i.e., the change of the perceptible, scope of 
attention during emotion-linked stimuli; Table 1) involves the broadening or 
narrowing of the range of attention as a function of the emotional valance of the 
target and/or the mood of the participant. Attentional scope effects are most 
clearly measured through manipulations of congruency. A congruency effect 
suggests that a relatively broader attentional scope was maintained, because, 
without a broad scope of attention the similarity or difference between a target 
and a distractor could not be seen. That is, a significant disparity in reaction 
times between incongruent and congruent conditions requires that attentional 
scope be broad enough to include the target and the distractors (Figure 6). 
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Figure 6. Scope of Attention-distractor Relationship.  
The difference between congruent (top) and incongruent (bottom) distractors, 
during focus on happy targets can only be identified when the scope of attention 
is broad enough for the distractors to be perceived. 
 
A further assessment of attentional scope can be made by way of the 
interaction of congruency and distance effects. For example, if healthy controls 
have a congruency effect in the near but not the far condition, and a high mood 
group has a congruency effect in the near and far conditions, we could conclude 
that the high mood group had a broader attentional scope than the healthy 
controls.  
           It is thought that both target and congruency effects may result 
from feature repetition (Eriksen, & Schultz, 1979; Hübner, & Töbel, 2019; 
Nieuwenhuis, et al., 2006; Schmidt, & De Houwer, 2011; Schmidt, Notebaert, & 
Van Den Bussche, 2015).  The more humans see something, the easier it is to 
learn what to do in response to that ‘thing’ the next time it is presented in the 
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environment. However, feature repetition does not explain why objects closer to 
the target are responded to faster than objects farther away. Alternatively, target, 
distractor and distance effects could be a product of conflict monitoring (i.e., in 
the ACC/MCC of healthy individuals), as all target and distractor changes would 
be processed differently, corresponding to the current level of danger. This would 
even apply to distance, as something closer to you (i.e., allowing you access to 
more data for evaluation and categorization) could be visually evaluated faster 
than something farther away (Eriksen, & Eriksen, 1974; Hübner, & Töbel, 2019; 
Mattler, 2006; Miller, 1991). 
Effects of Emotional Stimuli 
To gauge the effects of attentional scope, we need a device that will 
reliably and accurately transmit the proper emotion to the participant. One of the 
most intuitive ways humans communicate emotional information is through facial 
expressions. Keltner, and Ekman (2003) found that facial emotions are 
universally recognized, are associated with specific facial expressions, and are 
direct indicators of internal affective attitudes and dispositions (i.e., mood-state). 
Hoemann and Barrett (2018) found that sensory feedback from movement of 
facial muscles contributed to the internal occurrence of the emotional feeling (i.e., 
creating a feedback loop). This emotional-physiological feedback loop allows the 
individual to influence their own emotion state by the initiation of voluntary facial 
expressions (Beamish, Foster, Edwards, & Torsten, 2019; for further discussion 
of the feedback loop see Pressman, Jenkins, & Moskowitz, 2019). Emotions 
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result in physical and psychological changes (Schacter, Gilbert, & Wegner, 2011) 
that influence personal behaviors (Wilson-Mendenhall, Henriques, Barsalou, & 
Barrett, 2019) and the behaviors of others (Beamish, et al., 2019) in 
evolutionarily adaptive ways. The moment to moment human emotional 
experience corresponds to the specific patterns of emotional stimuli seen in facial 
expressions (Barrett, 2017). Both the monitoring of one’s own emotional states 
and the monitoring of emotions in others play a vital role in human perception 
(Gayet, Van der Stigchel, & Paffen, 2014; Gröne et al., 2015). 
These results show substantial evidence that the human face is a reliable, 
attention-grabbing stimulus, which can accurately transmit human emotional 
states to other humans without further output (i.e., without additional speaking, 
writing, etc.). Interestingly, schematic representations of the human face (i.e.,☺, 
or ) produce similar neural activations to actual images of human faces during 
functional magnetic resonance imaging (Britton, Shin, Barrett, Rauch, & Wright, 
2008; Wright, Martis, Shin, Fischer, & Rauch, 2002), making schematic 
emotional stimuli, an effective and reliable tool for the transmission and 
assessment of visual emotional attention content in behavioral experimentation.   
Effects of Emotional Face Stimuli 
The effects of emotional face stimuli during attention tasks are well 
documented. Barratt and Bundesen (2012), Gable and  Harmon-Jones (2012), 
and  Rowe, Hirsh, and  Anderson (2007) found consistent results, producing 
significantly longer response times to negative emotions (e.g., sad faces;) than 
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to positive (e.g., happy faces;☺). Rowe, Hirsh, and Anderson (2007) also found 
positive emotional states broaden the scope of attention.  Gable and Harmon-
Jones (2012) found negative emotional states narrow thought and action in 
healthy subjects. 
Most importantly, Barratt and Bundesen (2012) found congruency effects 
to happy-target schematic faces and not sad faces; demonstrating that viewing 
negative environmental stimuli narrowed the scope of attention in healthy 
subjects. In other words, when negative emotional stimuli were presented to the 
participant, the breath of their field of visual perception narrowed. This narrowing 
of the perceptible world reduced the observable emotional stimuli around the 
negative target (i.e., a narrow attentional scope effect; Table 1). These results 
indicate that emotional schematic faces can be used to trigger measurable 
changes in the scope of attention (Figure 7). 
 
 
Figure 7. Scope of Attention during Schematic Emotional Targets. 
Schematic emotional targets (i.e., center image) affect the modulation, or the 
breath of the stimuli perceived through the scope of attention (O’Donnell & 
Koshino, 2017), in healthy individuals.  
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Effects of Distance upon Stimuli Perception 
By manipulating the relative distance of the emotional distractor-faces, we 
get a glimpse of how much information the individual’s scope of attention is 
allowing them to perceive while processing a particular target emotion (i.e., while 
focusing on an emotional face-type; ☺ or , can the participant perceive the 
difference, or do they exhibit a different  RT to distractors which are happy or 
sad; ☺☺☺ or ☺, ☺☺ or ), in the near location (i.e., ☺☺☺) and the far 
location (i.e., ☺ ☺ ☺) (Rowe, Hirsh, & Anderson, 2007). Including distance as a 
factor provides data on the relative width of the scope of attention during a 
specifc, proximal or distal emotional-stimuli responses which are not the focus of 
selective attention, but greatly influence the human ability to gauge our external 
emotional environment (For survival see: Diéguez-Risco, Aguado, Albert, & 
Hinojosa, 2015; Kanske & Kotz, 2011, for distance see: Eriksen, & Eriksen, 1974; 
Hübner, & Töbel, 2019; Mattler, 2006; Miller, 1991). 
Additionally, the individuals internal perception of an item is dependent 
upon the inherent emotionality of the stimulus presented (i.e., whether the item 
conveys ‘happy’ or ‘sad’) (Chen, Marshall, Weidner, & Fink, 2009). Therefore, it 
is experimentally reasonable to extrapolate that the emotion the individual 
‘perceived’ at that moment corresponds to the RT produced in response (i.e., a 
sad face target with sad distractors which are presented far from the target would 
be responded to slower than distractors near to the target, and therefore, the 
near and far distractor conditions would be perceived as ‘different’; RT to    
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> ☺  ☺). Thus, the reaction to the distance of emotional stimuli allows the 
statistical evaluation of the participant’s perception of a particular emotion-liked 
target-distractor relationship. This target-distractor-distance data informs us as to 
the breath of the scope of attention at the moment the participant experiences 
the emotional stimuli.  
Fear’s Role in the Task 
Within the flanker task, the narrowing of the scope of attention to 
‘negative’ stimuli is the same response exhibited during fear (Bracha, 2006). Fear 
is associated with activation of the amygdala (Britton, Shin, Barrett, Rauch, & 
Wright, 2008) the same area which informs the ACC when processing emotions 
and mood. Fear is defined as an unpleasant emotion involving the belief that 
someone or something is dangerous (Farb, Chapman, & Anderson, 2013; 
Öhman, 2000) or likely to cause pain. Fear perception is possibly the most 
important perception in the survival of homo-sapiens (McFadyen, 2019; Olsson, 
& Phelps, 2007) specifically because fear and the scope of attention are so 
interdependent in the healthy human brain. Each time we measure a participants 
reaction time to a sad-face, we are gauging their fear response (Chen, Marshall, 
Weidner, & Fink, 2009; Rowe, Hirsh, & Anderson, 2007).  
Fear Perception in Mood-disordered Individuals 
Research has found that anxiolytics’ cyclic fear-based biases focus on the 
expectation of future threat (Bishop et al., 2004; Burkhouse et al., 2018; 
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Heitmann et al., 2017), whereas, those with depression tend to cycle 
remembrances of past fears (Langer et al., 2019). For each, imagining of these 
fears creates a perceived loss of emotional control (Farb, Chapman, & Anderson, 
2013). This perceived loss of control is often internalized by those with mood 
disorders as perceived physical threat (American Psychological Association, 
2013). Research has found that the perceived threat prevalent in anxiety and 
depression is accompanied by the same physiological responses (i.e., muscular 
tension), and cognitive difficulties (i.e., unfocused concentration) experienced 
during periods of physiologically-based fear.  
It is hypothesized that this perceived fear and the ensuing loss of control 
fuels cyclic thought (i.e., rumination or worry), increasing neural excitations in 
mood-processing regions of the brain, and strengthening connections 
perpetuating mood disorders (Nolen-Hoeksema, Wisco, and Lyubomirsky, 2008). 
The neural resources which are being limited by cyclic thoughts in mood-
disorders are, therefore, less available for paying adequate attention to their 
environment (Öhman, 2000). Craske, and Stein (2016) surmised that during 
mood disorders, a fear-based ‘effect precedes cause’ relationship exists, where 
the cyclic expectation of fear evidences in fear prior to the trigger for fear 
(Craske, & Stein, 2016). Furthermore, these cyclic thought patterns of anxiety 
and depression persist even when the mind is not directly thinking of the fear-
related stimuli (Bishop et al., 2004; Burkhouse et al., 2018; Heitmann et al., 2017; 
Langer, et al., 2019). These constant fear-related thoughts lead to corresponding 
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behaviors which can be measured during attentional tasks. The ability of 
attentional tasks to evaluate mood-disorder variances is best explained by the 
Attentional Control Theory (Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos, & Calvo, 2007). 
The Attentional Control Theory 
The Attentional Control Theory (ACT: Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos, & 
Calvo, 2007) unites the effects of the target, the distractors, distance (from target 
to distractor), and scope of attention (the breath of perceptible information) by 
focusing on the comparative neural processing efficiency of those with anxiety 
versus healthy controls (Eysenck, & Derakshan, 2011). The ACT attempts to 
explain the effect of mood on performance during tasks that require overall 
attention-control. The ACT has also been used to evaluate the attention of those 
with depressive symptomology (Joormann & Gotlib, 2008) because anxiety 
disorders and depression share cyclic fear-related thought patterns. And as we 
have discussed, fear has a direct correlation with the activation of the scope of 
attention. Research shows that the attention-related aspects of working memory 
are impaired during anxiety (Eysenck, & Derakshan, 2011), and can be 
compared to the impaired attentional control during depression (Bodenschatz, et 
al., 2011; Dai, Feng, & Koster, 2011; Joormann & Gotlib, 2008).  
Individuals scoring in the high anxiety range (Englert, & Bertrams, 2015) 
or the high depression range (Joormann & Gotlib, 2008) on self-report measures 
of mood, have been found to pay more attention to irrelevant stimuli (i.e., have 
less attentional control and exhibit a broadened attentional scope).This 
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commonality in behavioral symptomology between anxiety and depression is 
thought to directly relate to cyclic thought patterns (i.e., worry over potential 
consequences for failing to appropriately function in certain circumstances) 
(Bodenschatz, et al., 2018).  
Thus, the ACT links the ideas that cyclic thought ‘over-utilizes’ working 
memory capacity, and influences performance during tasks which require 
efficient attention regulation (Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos, & Calvo, 2007). 
Therefore, disorders that include ruminative symptomology are thought to hinder 
efficient regulation of the scope of attention (i.e., the attentional scope)by 
disrupting the balance between what the brain is attempting to focus on, and the 
novel, different, threatening, or surprising stimuli to which the brain automatically 
attends (Corbetta and Shulman, 2002). 
Despite this similarity between anxiety and depression with regard to the 
attentional scope there may be differences in regard to other aspects of attention. 
Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos, and  Calvo (2007) argued that anxious individuals 
can perform as accurately (i.e., anxiolytics achieve the same level of correct 
answers) as non-anxious individuals because they counteract their automatic 
processing deficits by investing additional neural effort  (i.e., anxiolytics take 
longer, but get the correct answer) (Nieuwenhuys & Oudejans, 2012; see Seipp, 
1991 for academic settings; Woodman & Hardy, 2003 for sports settings; Vytal, 
Cornwell, Letkiewicz, Arkin, & Grillon, 2013). Thus the anxious have to mentally 
try harder to obtain the same level of attentional focus as healthy controls. 
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Conversely, depressives are less accurate (i.e., depressives achieve less correct 
answers in the same time period as healthy controls) (Bodenschatz, et al., 2018), 
with higher depressive symptomology relating to a greater bias towards happy 
faces. 
As a whole, those with mood-disorders have been shown to have biases 
in attention control that are not seen in healthy individuals. The ACT posits that 
the differences are affected by, or have caused, unhealthy resource utilization. 
Evidence seems to suggest that the differences in the mood-disordered brain are 
partly due to the loss or usurping of neural resources. But little research has 
been conducted to determine how this maladaptive resource utilization affects 
the perception of life.  
Research has shown that items not perceived (for whatever reason) 
cannot be moved to memory (Heurley, & Ferrier, 2015; Martin, 1992; Mitterer, 
Horschig, Müsseler, & Majid, 2009), and that human visual attention is a major 
source of externally derived, but memory-allocated information (Coon, & Mitterer, 
2008; Haladjian, & Montemayor, 2015; Gregory, 1970, 1974, 1987, 1997, 2006, 
2008) – the very information used to construct the internal  ‘map of human 
existence’. So, the question becomes, do mood-disorder induced deficits in 
resource utilization affect the individual’s perception of life. Said differently, would 
two individuals, one with a mood-disorder and one without, both perceive an 
emotional situation in the same manner?  
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Herein, we utilized the inherent mechanisms of attentional control to 
activate the scope of attention of individuals with mood-disorder symptomology 
and without, to identify if mood-disorders alter visual emotion perception.
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CHAPTER FOUR: 
RATIONALE FOR THE PRESENT STUDY 
Rationale 
The rationale for this study is to ascertain whether mood disorders affect 
the scope of attention (i.e., broaden or narrow the attentional scope effect; ASE, 
Table 1) during emotional interactions; thus, altering perception. Toward this end, 
we have evaluated the similarities between anxiety and depression. First, 
depression and anxiety are highly correlated in the general population. Second, 
both depressives (Dai, & Feng, 2011; Dai, Feng, & Koster, 2011) and anxiolytics 
(Berggren, et al., 2015) experience decreased attentional control, specific to 
inhibition. Third, both depression (Bodenschatz, et al., 2018) and anxiety 
(Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos, & Calvo, 2007) share increased attention to sad 
faces. Fourth, anxiety and depression share similarities in the role cyclic thoughts 
play in the taxing of working memory capacity. Fifth, both tap into the fear 
response and its subsequent functions. Sixth, both share brain activation areas.  
These similarities lead to the supposition that there may be a single, 
unifying function across anxiolytic and depressive disorders. This common 
function would seem to concern the scope of attention. The scope of attention 
has been shown to be active in both anxiety and depression; is affected by global 
attentional control; is part of the fear response; functions by using the same brain 
areas as mood disorders; functions in a feedback loop; is modulated by the 
emotionality of the target; and affects the perception of emotional stimuli, thus, 
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affecting performance on attention tasks. Since depression and anxiety are 
highly correlated, it seems reasonable to expect that they would share similar 
deficits with regard to attentional control; like the scope of attention. 
Despite these reasons for predicting common attentional deficits across 
the mood disorders, we can expect differences as well. Researchers found 
limited evidence indicating that attentional scope may be affected differently in 
anxiolytic (Bowler, et al., 2012) and depressive disorders (Bodenschatz, et al., 
2018; Dai, & Feng, 2011; Dai, Feng, & Koster, 2011; Joorman, & Gotlib, 2008). In 
addition, we know anxiety sufferers achieve healthy control levels of performance 
by exerting more effort, thereby taking longer than healthy controls to respond 
(Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos, & Calvo, 2007; Nieuwenhuys & Oudejans, 2012; 
Seipp, 1991; Woodman and Hardy, 2003; Vytal, et al., 2013). But, in depression, 
high brain activations decrease performance accuracy (Bodenschatz, et al., 
2018). Additionally, the effects already noted (i.e., a decreased ability to inhibit 
negative distractors) may have varying consequences per each mood-disorder 
(Dai, and Feng, 2011; Dai, Feng, & Koster, 2011). 
To add to the possible effect variances per mood-disorder, anxiety has 
two main types: Trait, (i.e., generalized to all situations or all of the time) and 
state (i.e., occurring in specific situations or at this moment). Individuals with trait 
anxiety (Rothbart, Ellis, Rueda, & Posner, 2003) have been found to have low 
overall attentional control, which has been shown to increase RTs to stimuli 
(Bowler, et al., 2012; Eysenck, Payne, & Derakshan, 2005). Berggren, et al. 
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(2015) found that trait anxiolytics also have enhanced visual detection abilities to 
facial emotions (i.e., are more susceptible to stimuli, regardless of stimulus type), 
which is consistent with reacting faster to emotional stimuli than healthy controls.  
Eysenck, Payne, & Derakshan, (2005) found that state anxiolytics (i.e., 
situational anxiety) were able to narrow scope of attention during the 
presentation of negative stimuli (i.e., mirroring healthy individuals), while 
confirming that state anxiolytics were slower to achieve the inhibitory response 
(i.e., had significantly slower RTs). Trait anxiolytics and depressives have 
commonalities as well. Trait anxiolytics and depressives were not able to narrow 
scope to negative distractors (i.e., they experienced a broad ASE to negative 
flanking or surrounding information that might otherwise be forcibly ignored or 
excluded from the individuals perception). It is important to note that this 
commonality in trait anxiolytics and depressives is reflective of the brains 
processing of the distractors, and does not relate to the target; Ø) (Dai, & 
Feng, 2011; Dai, Feng, & Koster, 2011). However, state, trait and depression 
were also found to have a bias for fear or ‘danger’ target-items (i.e., as when a 
sad face is focused upon; ØØ), allowing negative targets to capture attention, 
thereby slowing the RT of the participant (Langer, et al, 2019).  
Lastly, it is important to note that the findings discussed in this rationale 
section generally involve longer RTs for mood disorder groups. These longer 
RT’s were described in the various literary findings as: ‘low attentional control’, or 
‘having a bias for’ negative or positive targets or distractors, or ‘having an inability 
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to ignore’ distractors when compared with healthy individuals (i.e., there was little 
commonality in the naming of the attentional factors). The non-standard labeling 
of attentional control mechanisms makes findings difficult to interpret, and to use 
for predictions. Once the intervening factors already discussed are added to the 
evaluation of moods effect upon emotional attention processing, we are left with 
an even more complex evaluation.   
Therefore, to clarify the current findings, and to assist in the development 
of realistic experimental expectations, the various independent findings were 
integrated into a literature-based, functional representation or ‘map’ of mood-
dependent emotional attention responses (Figure 8). 
 
 
Figure 8. Evidence of Attentional Scope Modulation. 
Elongated face (i.e., Broad scope of attention; ASE = Distractors perceived) or 
round face (i.e., Narrow ASE = Distractors inhibited). Shorter RT = Greater 
attention control, longer RT less attention control.  
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Literature-based Attention Control Map 
Figure 8 represents the current emotional attention task findings, 
separated by mood-state. This ‘map’ of attentional control allows us to form 
expectations, or predictions, based upon the current findings related to the 
modulation of the scope of attention in healthy controls, anxiolytics, and 
depressives (i.e., as attentional control is measured in terms of RT and 
congruency effects).  
Predicting Influence of Reaction Time 
Per literature, all groups would be expected to respond more slowly to sad 
than to happy targets (Anxiety: Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos, & Calvo, 2007, 
depression: Bodenschatz, et al., 2018). This is exampled in Figure 8 by state, 
trait and depressions happy and sad faces having longer RTs, or being ‘higher in 
the figure’, than the control groups; continued in Figure 9. left). 
 
 
Figure 9. Influences on Mood Reaction Times 
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Common slow RTs of state, trait and depression (left), and the additional RT 
changes expected from trait anxiolytics’ ability to recognize faces (right). This 
figure represents the RT differences only. See figure 10 congruency (ASE) 
variance. Round face= No congruency effect (CE); Narrow ASE, Elongates face= 
CE; Broad ASE. 
 
 
Predicting the Influence of Emotional Faces 
 However, Trait anxiety has an added influence on RT deficits (Figure 9, 
right) because trait sufferers are more susceptible to recognition of emotional 
faces. This could evidence in slightly faster trait group RTs (i.e., compared to 
state or depression); though these RTs would still be slower than for the control 
group.  
Predicting the Influence of Negative Distractors 
The scope of attention (i.e., the attentional scope effect; ASE) for state 
anxiety has been found to be comparable to controls, but depression and trait 
anxiety have a strong inability to ignore negative distractors. This could result in 
the ASEs for both depression and trait anxiety to becoming broad to both happy 
and sad targets and distractors (i.e., to perceive distractors, a broad ASE, with 
the corresponding congruency effect, is necessary) (Figure 10, A, left, and B 
middle).  
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Figure 10. Influences on Mood Congruency Effects. 
(A) Common inability to ignore distractors among trait anxiety and depression 
(left), and the additional congruency changes expected from traits ability to 
recognize faces (right). (B) The hypothesized perceptual differences between 
stimuli presented and stimuli perceived during hypothesized ASEs. This figure 
represents the ASE differences only. See figure 9 for RT variance. Round face= 
No congruency effect (CE); Narrow ASE, Elongates face= CE; Broad ASE. 
 
But, there is an issue with making a prediction of a broad ASEs for 
depression and trait anxiety during both happy and sad targets, and distractors: 
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A broad ASE has only been shown in the flanker task (i.e., used herein) with 
healthy controls responding to happy targets, not sad. Moreover, we found no 
flanker-task research showing a broad ASE in response to any negative-type 
targets (i.e., the center, selective focus). However, a broad ASE has been shown 
with negative distractors (i.e., the surrounding emotional stimuli; distractors) (Dai, 
and Feng, 2011; Dai, Feng, & Koster, 2011). When we add state, trait and 
depressions bias towards any negative, fear, or danger item, we cold surmise 
that there may be an interaction between the modulation of the sad targets ASE, 
a strong inability to ignore negative distractors, and the bias toward negative 
items. (Figure 10, B).  
When assessing this possible prediction, we saw a limiting factor: If sad 
targets ASEs were to become broadened, they could only achieve this in one 
instance: sad target congruent (i.e., ; as this is the only condition which has  
the requisite negative target plus negative distractors). This could pose a 
problem during the analysis, as both negative and positive distractor recognition 
is necessary for a congruency effect (i.e.,  minus ☺☺ ).  
Predicting the Influence of Perceived Negative Emotionality 
One last evaluation of a possible sad target, ASE prediction came via the 
participant’s perception of emotional content. Since both anxiety and depression 
share a bias for sad targets (Bodenschatz, et al., 2018; Eysenck, Derakshan, 
Santos, & Calvo, 2007) and a bias for fear or danger ‘target’ items (Langer, et al, 
2019), the perceived ‘bad-ness’ of the sad target may also exert additional force 
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(i.e., above and beyond that of the normal, healthy fear response) to keep the 
ASE narrow (Figure 10, right). 
For these reasons, we expect that there will be no measurably broad ASE 
for any mood disorder during presentation of sad targets (i.e., a narrow ASE 
would be expected for sad targets) (Figure 10, right).  
Predicting the Influence of the Happy Target: State Anxiety 
As mentioned above, healthy controls and individuals with high state 
anxiety have been consistently shown to have broad scope to happy targets 
(Eysenck, Payne, & Derakshan, 2005), but scope of attention for trait anxiolytic 
individuals is more complicated.  
Predicting the Influence of the Happy Target: Trait Anxiety 
Individuals with high trait anxiety might be expected to show a broad 
scope of attention during happy targets due to the inability to ignore negative 
distractors. If negative surrounding emotions are perceived more than they 
should be during focus on a happy target (Dai, & Feng, 2011; Dai, Feng, & 
Koster, 2011), this negative distractor bias would use up attentional resources 
needed to differentiate between congruent (i.e., ☺☺☺) from incongruent (i.e., 
☺). Therefore, the literature should reflect longer RT to happy incongruent 
targets, only (i.e., only happy targets with the negative distractors are shown a 
bias); the literature does not. In this scenario, larger congruency effects would be 
seen in trait than in healthy individuals, for happy congruencies. But current 
literature indicates trait anxiolytics to have generally low overall attentional 
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control (Bowler, et al., 2012 ) which would shrink congruency effect due to 
inability to differentiate surrounding distractors.  
Another explanation may be that the sad distractor ‘over-emphasis’ 
activates the scope of attention to narrow in response to the heightened threat of 
‘badness’ of the sad distractors. If so, this would result in the scope of attention 
ignoring ones selective attention to broaden the ASE during happy targets (i.e., 
the scope of attentions  happy-target selective-focus  response would be the fear 
response; narrow), Functionally, if these results were supported, trait anxiolytics 
would then perceive happy congruent  as: ☺☺☺,  and happy incongruent as: ☺.  
A final interaction in the trait group is that trait anxiolytics have been 
shown to possess enhanced visual recognition ability for emotional target faces 
(Berggren, et al., 2015). The target-face emotion has already been shown to 
impact distractor perception. The enhanced recognition of emotional target faces 
can be seen as a bias toward positive emotional faces allowing trait-sufferer to 
accurately discern the emotion of the target faster than healthy individuals. The 
enhanced recognition of the positive, emotional, happy-face should sustain a 
broad ASE; allowing perception of the surroundings, salient emotions (i.e., the 
‘flankers or distractors). 
 In sum, we find there is much evidence pointing to a broad ASE for trait 
anxiolytics during happy target congruencies (i.e., allowing trait anxiolytics to 
perceive the world the same as healthy controls), therefore, we predict that the 
trait group will show broad ASEs in happy congruencies (Figure 10, right).  
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Predicting the Influence of the Happy Target: Depression 
The ASE in depression carries low attentional control (Berggren, et al., 
2015), like trait and state anxiety (Figure 10, left). However, depression carries 
the same inability to ignore sad distracting information, as trait (Dai, & Feng, 
2011; Dai, Feng, & Koster, 2011), but without the enhanced facial recognition 
ability of trait anxiety (Figure 10, right). Therefore, happy targets may become 
overwhelmed by the influence of negative distractors when depressives view 
salient emotions, thereby producing happy targets with a narrow ASE (i.e., all 
that would be perceived is a center, happy-faced target) (Figure 10, B). 
Predicting the Influence of Distance 
Remembering the Attentional Control Theory (ACT), we follow the 
supposition that better resource utilization means higher attentional control. 
Therefore, it is clear that the presence of a congruency effect in a near distractor 
condition would indicate a broadened attentional scope (i.e., the distractors are 
close to the target and can more easily be noticed or can be less easily ignored). 
Such a congruency effect would be appropriate and normative for healthy 
individuals in the happy target condition, but not the sad target condition. But 
existing theory and research provide much less of a basis for predictions about 
congruency effects in a far distractor condition. A congruency effect with far 
distractors would signify an especially broad attentional scope. It is not clear 
whether this effect is normative in healthy individuals under the happy target 
condition. The research is lacking. But it would not be inconsistent with ACT. 
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With regard to sad targets, however, a congruency effect to far distractors would 
definitely be unexpected in healthy individuals, just as a congruency effect would 
be unexpected for near distractors. For both near and far distractors, congruency 
effects to sad targets would indicate an abnormally broadened attentional scope 
for healthy adults. Since there is little research within the Attention Control 
Theory (ACT) that concerns congruency and distance, we make no predictions 
as to how distractor distance might interact with congruency in state, trait or 
depression (i.e., Figure 10 has no distance distinction made for any group). 
The reviewed findings have inconsistencies, but, overall, they suggest that 
state anxiolytics may be most similar to healthy controls in their processes of 
attentional control. Also, trait anxiolytics and depressives may share similar 
attentional deficits. But it remains the case that there are no studies directly 
comparing the attentional scope of anxiolytics and depressives to healthy 
controls. 
Hypotheses 
When comparing the performance of state, trait or depression groups with 
the performance of healthy controls, Attentional Control Theory (ACT) provides 
the basis for several key predictions regarding the effects of mood on attentional 
scope. 
The first hypothesis below concerns replication of standard effects 
previously found in the literature. Such replication is important to establishing that 
the current sample of participants is typical of samples previously employed, and 
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helps to establish the external validity of the findings in regards to the 
hypotheses. Hypotheses 2 and 3 are the novel predictions of the study.  
1. Replication of Prior Findings. We hypothesize that the healthy controls 
will show target effects (i.e., happy will have faster mean RTs than Sad), distance 
effects (i.e., Near faster than Far) and congruency effects (i.e., Congruent faster 
than Incongruent). Further, a congruency effect will obtained for happy targets, 
but not for sad targets. That is, controls will show broad attentional scope effects 
(i.e., where there is a congruency effect present) during presentation of happy 
targets in the near, and possibly the far, conditions. 
2. Effects of Mood on Attentional Scope.  
Healthy controls and state anxiety. We hypothesize that the healthy 
controls and individuals with high state anxiety will show target effects, distance 
effects, and congruency effects. Further, the congruency effect will obtain for 
happy targets but not for sad targets. That is, the control and state anxiety 
groups will both show broad attentional scope effects (ASEs) during the 
presentation of happy targets in the near, and possibly the far, conditions. The 
ASEs may occur more slowly for those with state anxiety than for healthy 
individuals. Both groups should show a narrowed ASE to sad targets due to the 
control group’s adaptive survival response to fear and states anxiety’s bias for 
sad targets and for fear or danger items (Figure 11). 
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Figure 11. Hypothesized Findings for This Study. 
Round face= No congruency effect (CE); Narrow ASE, Elongates face= CE; 
Broad ASE. 
 
 
 
Healthy controls and trait anxiety. We hypothesize that the healthy 
controls and individuals with high trait anxiety will show target effects, distance 
effects, and congruency effects. Further, the congruency effect will be obtained 
for happy targets but not for sad targets. That is, controls and trait anxiolytics will 
show broad ASEs during presentation of happy targets in the near, and possibly 
the far, conditions. However, during sad targets, consistently narrow ASEs 
should be observed due a bias to sad and fear items. We predict that the trait 
group’s lack of attentional control will slow RTs, but their enhanced recognition 
for faces will result in acceleration of RTs to both happy and sad targets. As a 
result of these opposing trends, the trait group will not be significantly different 
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from the control group. The enhanced happy target recognition may help retain a 
broad ASE, even in the presence of decreased inhibition to negative distractors. 
RTs for those broad ASEs may be no different than the control group (Figure 11).  
Healthy controls and depression. We hypothesize that the healthy 
controls and those suffering from depression will both show target effects and 
distance effects, but they will not show the same congruency effects. That is, 
depressives will show no congruency effect for happy or sad targets due to the 
increased influence of negative distractors with happy targets and the bias for 
sad faces and fear items during sad targets. By contrast, controls will show broad 
ASEs during presentation of happy targets in the near, and possibly the far, 
conditions, and a narrow ASE to sad targets. Depressions narrow ASEs may be 
significantly slower than the control groups (Figure 11). 
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CHAPTER FIVE: 
METHODS 
Participants 
This study included 170 male and female, English speaking university 
students. These participants were recruited through the SONA: Participant 
Management System (SONA systems, 2019) (Figure 12 and see Procedure 
section, Figure 15).  
 
 
Figure 12. Participant Flow Chart.  
Participants (n = 170) completed experiment (i.e., psychological metrics and 
attention task). Mood groups included Control, State, Trait and Depression (n = 
33, respectively). High mood groups included varying degrees of mood 
comorbidities, Control did not.  
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The sample was used to create a Control or Healthy Group along with 
three Mood Disorder Groups – State Anxiety, Trait Anxiety, and Depression. 
Given the degree of comorbidity typically found for mood disorders, the number 
of participants in the study was not sufficient to create mutually exclusive groups, 
and would not be as representative of the current, highly comorbid mood-
disorder population data. Thus, the mood disorder groups were not mutually 
exclusive and the same participant could appear in more than one group. For this 
reason, the groups were not directly compared in the study.  
Participants with reaction times greater than 2.5 standard deviations from 
the mean and/or accuracy scores lower than 0.7 of the mean were excluded from 
further analyses. All participants were treated in accordance with the Ethical 
Principles of Psychologists and the Code of Conduct as established by the 
American Psychological Association (2013), and authorized under protocols and 
procedures approved by the Institutional Review Board of California State 
University, San Bernardino (Appendix A). 
Materials 
Psychological Metrics.  
This study includes several valid, clinical-level measures used in the 
diagnosis of mood disorders. These measures were used to identify participants 
whose scores meet the diagnostic criteria for a mood disorder as stated in the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (American Psychological 
Association, 2013). Such individuals, however, cannot be deemed to have a 
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clinical level mental disorder solely from the data herein. The diagnostic criteria 
stated in the DSM include the use of additional measures, such as a differential 
diagnosis, to rule out other concurrently occurring (co-morbid) or intervening 
factors. In clinical practice, this differential would assist in identifying the subset 
of patients presenting symptoms that might be attributable to something other 
than a mood disorder per se (e.g., the effects of medication, another medical 
condition, etc.) and would distinguish these individuals from those who do have a 
mental disorder. The present study does not include the additional medical 
information required to make a diagnosis of an individual mood disorder.  
Instead, this study identifies mood disorder scores within the clinical range(s) of 
an active mental disorder, for statistical purposes. Therefore, this studies’ data, in 
isolation, should not be used as a clinical diagnosis of a mental disorder in any 
participant(s). 
To accomplish mood measurement, participants were instructed to fill out 
the following clinical-level self-report questionnaires: 
Anxiety Measurement - Trait. Trait anxiety (i.e., generalized anxiety 
symptomology; occurring across many situations) was measured using the State-
Trait Anxiety Inventory –Trait anxiety version (STAI-T; Spielberger, 1972; 
Spielberger, Gorsuch, Lushene, Vagg, & Jacobs, 1983) (Appendix B). The STAI-
T demonstrates reliability in measuring generalized anxious symptomology in 
university student populations (Cronbach’s  = .79 to .93; A Cronbach’s alpha 
internal consistency reliability value of .70 or above indicates good reliability; 
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Cronbach, 1951) (Bee Seok, Abd Hamid, Mutang, & Ismail, 2018; Grös, Antony, 
Simms, & McCabe, 2007). Participants responded to 20 questions about how 
they feel ‘in general’. The responses, via computer keyboard, use a Likert scale 
range of ‘1’ meaning ‘almost never’, through ‘4’ meaning ‘almost always’. 
Questions addressed mood-state though perception (i.e., ‘I feel like a failure’), 
attention (i.e., ‘…unimportant thoughts runs through my mind and bothers me’), 
and behavior (i.e., ‘I feel …restless’) factors relating to their general, anxiolytic 
level. The score range was 20 - 80. Test-maker scoring guidelines required 
reverse coding (i.e., 1, 2, 3, or 4 = 4, 3, 2, 1; For example, a response of 4 would 
convert to 1, or 2 to 3) of questions 1, 2, 5, 8, 10, 11, 15, 16, 19, & 20 before final 
scoring. General (Spielberger, 1972), and university-population specific research 
(Maynard, et al., 2010; Vitasari, et al., 2011) suggests a STAI-T total sub-
threshold score of 21-40 is indicative of clinically mild (i.e., inconsequential for 
short periods), 41-60 is moderate (i.e., consequential for short periods only), or 
61-80 is severe (i.e., consequential for any length of time) trait anxiety. All 
participants not in the control group (See Control Measurement, below) will be 
placed in a High Mood group. The 33 highest scoring individuals, with a minimum 
score of 50 on the STAI-T (i.e., regardless of comorbid mood-scores), will be 
referred to as the Trait group (Figure 12). 
Anxiety Measurement - State. State anxiety (i.e., situational anxiety 
symptomology; occurring during a specific circumstance) was measured using 
the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory –State anxiety version (STAI-S; Spielberger, 
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1972; Spielberger, Gorsuch, Lushene, Vagg, & Jacobs, 1983) (Appendix C). The 
STAI-S demonstrates reliability in measuring situational anxious symptomology 
in university student populations (Cronbach’s  = .78 to .92) (Bee Seok, Abd 
Hamid, Mutang, & Ismail, 2018; Grös, Antony, Simms, & McCabe, 2007). 
Participants responded to 20 questions about how they feel ‘right now’ or ‘at this 
moment’. The responses, via computer keyboard, use a Likert scale range of ‘1’ 
meaning ‘not at all’, through ‘4’ meaning ‘very much so’. Questions addressed 
mood-state through perception (i.e., ‘I feel frightened’), attention (i.e., ‘I feel 
confused’), and behavior (i.e., ‘I feel jittery’) factors relating to their situational, 
anxiolytic level. The score range was 20 - 80. Test-maker scoring guidelines 
required reverse coding (See Anxiety Measurement –Trait) of questions 21, 23, 
26, 27, 30, 33, 34, 36, & 39 before final scoring. For general and university-
population specific research on STAI-S score sub-thresholds totals, see STAI-T.  
All participants not in the control group (See Control Measurement, below) will be 
placed in a High Mood group, The 33 highest scoring individuals, with a minimum 
score of 50 on the STAI-S (i.e., regardless of comorbid mood-scores) will be 
referred to as the State group (Figure 12).  
Depression Measurement. The Center for Epidemiologic Studies 
Depression scale (CESD; Eaton, Muntaner, Smith, Tien, & Ybarra, 2004; Radloff, 
1977) (Appendix D) was used to measure the level of depressive symptomology 
occurring both at the moment, and in general. The CESD demonstrates excellent 
reliability in measuring the depressive symptomology of the university student 
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population (Cronbach’s  = .87 to .92; Chang, & Chen, 2018; Jiang, et al., 2019; 
Shean,& Baldwin, 2008; Umegaki, & Todo, 2017). Participants responded to 20 
questions about how they have ‘felt or behaved’ during ‘the past week’. The 
responses, via computer keyboard, use a Likert scale range of ‘1’ meaning 
‘rarely, or less than 1 day’ (of the past week), through ‘4’ meaning ‘most of the 
time, or 5-7 days’. Questions addressed mood-state though perception (i.e., ‘I felt 
people disliked me’), attention (i.e., ‘I had trouble keeping my mind on what I was 
doing’), and behavior (i.e., ‘I talked less than usual’) factors relating to their 
depressive level. The initial score range was 20 - 80. Test-maker scoring 
guidelines require all responses to have one number subtracted from each 
question’s score (i.e., 1, 2, 3, or 4 = 0, 1, 2, or 3), then, questions 4, 8, 12, and 16 
had to be reverse coded (i.e., 0, 1, 2, 3 = 3, 2, 1, 0) before final scoring; making 
the true range 0-60. General (Radloff, 1977), and university-population specific 
research (Chang, & Chen, 2018; Jiang, et al., 2019; Shean,& Baldwin, 2008; 
Umegaki, & Todo, 2017) suggests a CESD total score of 16 or greater is 
indicative of clinical depression.  
The CESD allocates scores at or above 16 to be clinically depressed. The 
revised scale (CESD-R) allows further depth in categorization of the respondents 
scoring 16-60. To utilize the CESD-R scoring valances, herein, the CESD 
participant responses scoring from 16-60 will reflect the sub-threshold CESD-R 
scoring valances (Figure 13).  
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Figure 13. Illustration of CESD Modified Scoring.  
The Center for Epidemiological Studies Depression scale (CESD) and the 
revised scale (CESD-R) modifications. Note: No other score-reporting 
modifications were made to other psychological metrics used. 
 
 
All participants not in the control group (See Control Measurement, below) 
will be placed in a High Mood group, The 33 highest scoring individuals, with a 
minimum score of 25 on the CESD (i.e., regardless of comorbid mood-scores) 
will be referred to as the Depression group (Figure 13, bottom). 
Control Measurement. Due to the inherent perception of one being ‘tested’ 
in a human laboratory experimental environment, some rise in anxiety may be 
expected in control group participants (Bourne, 2000). Therefore, participants 
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were assigned to the healthy control group based on three concurrent scores: 30 
or less on the STAI-T and 30 or less on the STAI-S and 15 or less on the CESD. 
Attention Task  
The Emotional Flanker (EF) task is adapted from Barratt, and Bundesen’s 
(2012) experiment 1, and uses emotionally expressive schematic stimuli (i.e., 
targets: happy-face and sad-face, and distractors: Sad-face, happy-face, neutral-
face) to test attentional inhibition (Eriksen, & Eriksen, 1974; Eriksen, & Schultz, 
1979) (Figure 14). 
 
 
Figure 14. Schematic Emotional Stimuli. 
(O’Donnell, 2016).  
 
The task was programmed in E-Prime 3.0 (Psychology Software Tools, 
2019), and divided into one practice block comprising 20 trials where participants 
were instructed to keep accuracy ratings above 95% (i.e., reported back to them 
in a feedback screen). The EF had 600 main trials, separated into 10 blocks of 
60 trials each. Each trial began with a fixation point (i.e., ‘+’) displayed in the 
center of the screen for 500 milliseconds (ms). The stimulus target (e.g., a 
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happy-face; ☺, or sad-face; ) appeared above the ‘+’ with one of three 
congruency conditions (CCs). CCs included a horizontal pair of stimuli (e.g., two 
happy-faces; ☺☺, sad-faces;  or neutral faces; ) surrounding, or ‘flanking’ 
the target, with three levels: ‘same’ as target type (i.e., congruent; ☺☺☺ or 
) or ‘different’ than the target (i.e., incongruent; ☺ or ☺☺) or neither 
the same nor different than the target type (i.e., neutral; ☺ or ). The 
CCs appeared at two distances from the target location: ‘close to’ the target (i.e., 
near; ☺☺☺,  ☺, etc.) or ‘farther away from the target’ (i.e., far; ☺  ☺  ☺,   ☺  
, etc.). Participants were instructed to press the ‘Z’ key with their left hand if the 
middle face is a sad-face and press the ‘M’ key with their right hand if the middle 
face is happy. Neutral face (i.e.,) flankers (i.e., ☺ or ) were also used 
as a near and far distance CC to evaluate the accuracy of the sad and happy 
conditions, and to reflect previous literature for healthy controls. However, the 
participants received no instructions on how to respond to the neutral CC. 
Response windows auto-terminated at 2000 ms. An interval of 500 ms elapsed 
between trials. The order of presentation of the trials target, distance and CCs 
were randomized.   
Procedure 
The experimental session was in a quiet, laboratory setting.  Participants 
completed an informed consent, and were randomly assigned an anonymous 
identification code for the experimental session. Next, paper surveys containing 
demographic information, and mood assessment measures (e.g., STAI-T, CESD, 
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and STAI-S, in that order) were completed in pen, by participants at a desktop 
computer workstation. The workstation included a standard keyboard, mouse, 19 
inch monitor and 3-sided privacy shields (one situated behind the computer and 
one covering both the left and right side view-areas of the participant; limiting 
participant-view to only his/her workstation).After the room-lights were turned off, 
participants completed the EF computerized task, seated at a viewing distance of 
approximately 30 inches from the monitor, and were asked to focus their field-of-
view on the middle of the monitors screen. The experiment lasted approximately 
40 minutes (Figure 15).  
 
 
Figure 15. Participant‘s Experimental Progression.  
SONA accessed outside laboratory. Laboratory experimental session: 5 minute 
introduction (by only one a researcher to prevent confounds), participants 
session number assigned by computer participant randomly chose. After 
Emotional Flanker completion, experimental session ends with participate 
logging name on sign-out sheet to receive academic credit. 
 
57 
 
Design 
This study involves a 2 X 2 X 3 repeated measures design. The principle 
analyses will be within-group in nature. These will consist of repeated measures 
ANOVAs of Target (happy-face vs. sad-face) by Distance (near vs. far) by 
Congruency (congruent vs. neutral, vs. incongruent) conducted separately for 
each of the four groups in the study (e.g., Control, State, Trait, Depression) 
(Table 2).  
 
Table 2. Independent Variable Stimuli and Conditions. 
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The four groups could not be included in the same analysis because the 
groups are not mutually exclusive (i.e., some mood groups had participants with 
comorbidity of high mood disorder scores; Figure 12) (Table 3). 
 
Table 3. Participant Distribution across Mood Groups 
 
 
 
To create the Control group, the lowest scoring participants on the CESD, 
and STAI-S, and -T (i.e., scoring as having no depression, and no/low state or 
trait anxiety) were taken from the Low Mood group (n = 33; also see Figure 12). 
To create the depression, state anxiety, or trait anxiety groups, the highest 
scoring participants were taken from the High Mood group (n = 33 each group; 
see Figure 12). For example: Depression had, 'across one mood group' (i.e., 
depression; Table 3): 5 participants, 'across two groups' (Depression and state = 
7, and depression and trait = 7): 14 participants, and 'across three mood groups' 
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(Depression and state and trait): 14 participants; producing 5 + 14 + 14 = 33 
participants in the depression group. 
 The Dependent variable is a quantitative, continuous variable: reaction 
times in milliseconds (ms.). The mean score for each of the four groups (control = 
558 ms., state = 604 ms., trait = 572 ms., depression = 578 ms.) was also 
computed (Figure 4). 
 
Table 4. Mood Group Mean Reaction Times 
 
 
Results 
Phase 1 Analysis 
These analyses were undertaken to replicate prior effects in the literature 
with healthy controls so as to establish that the current control sample is 
comparable to samples previously employed in attention research. Specifically, 
analyses were intended to replicate standard main effects for target emotionality 
(happy, sad), distance (near, far), and congruency (congruent, neutral, 
incongruent) in healthy controls. Millisecond reaction times were analyzed in a 
repeated measures Analysis of Variance (ANOVA). This 2 x 2 x 3 analysis was 
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conducted on the control group (i.e., those without clinically depressive or 
anxiolytic scores).  
Phase 1 Results 
Results indicated that there were significant target effects (F 1, 32 = 13.01, 
p = .001), where happy targets were responded to significantly faster than sad, 
and significant distance effects (F 1, 32 = 54.31, p < .001), where near responses 
were faster than far. In addition, the congruency effect was significant (F 1, 32 = 
20.37, p < .001). Congruent stimuli were responded to faster than incongruent 
stimuli (Table 3, see table 5 for corresponding means and standard deviations).  
 
Table 5. Control Group 2 X 2 X 3 ANOVA. 
 
 
These data indicate that the control group correctly identified whether a 
face was happy or sad and processed the positive or negative emotionality of the 
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targets differently. The control group also correctly identified whether a distractor 
face was near to, far from, the same as, or different from the target while 
processing each change in distance or congruency in a unique fashion. Results 
indicate that the control group mirrors the trends of publications on emotional 
target-distractor relationships with /without a distance factor (Figures 16 & 17). 
 
 
Figure 16. Phase 1 Analysis Results – Target and Congruency  
Comparison of present study with prior findings in the literature. Significant target 
and congruency effects. (A) Barratt and Bundesen (2012) Experiment 1, (B) 
Fenske, and Eastwood (2003), and (C) Control group data. All RT data show the 
same trend. Control group: Happy target responses are faster than sad (F 1, 32 = 
13.01, p = .001), and happy congruent is faster than incongruent (F 1, 32 = 54.31, 
p < .001), with sad target congruency effects non-significant. Confidence 
intervals = .95. 
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Figure 17. Phase 1 Analysis Results – Distance. 
Comparison of present study with prior findings in the literature: distance effects.. 
(A) Olk, Dinu, Zielinski, & Kopper, (2018) (data illustration); F3, 75 = 15.48, 
p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.382, and (B) control group data. Both sets of RT data show the 
same trend. Control group: Near distractor distance from target is associated with 
faster RT than far (F = 13.01, p = .001, ηp2 = .63). Confidence intervals = .95. 
 
 
Phase 2 Analysis  
In order to test hypotheses 2 and 3, separate, within-group target (happy, 
sad) by distance (near, far) by congruency (congruent, incongruent) ANOVAs 
were conducted on participants’ mean reaction times for each of the three Mood 
Disorder Groups (Figure 18).  
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Figure 18. Mood Scores and Mood-group Assignments.  
Psychological metric mood score valances and participant response distribution 
(present study). (A) State-Trait Anxiety Inventory for State and Trait, and Center 
for Disease Control Depression scale with number of participants who scored in 
each metrics valance. (B) Histogram of (A) right side. The highest scoring 33 
participants per metric were allocated to each mood group. 
 
 
Phase 2 Results  
Between Group Effects 
Main effects. Target: There was a significant target main effect for the 
control group (F(1, 32) = 13.07, p = .001, ηp2 = .29), but not for the State, Trait or 
Depression groups (Table 6). 
Table 6. Comparison of ANOVAs  
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The control group’s mean RT for Happy targets (M = 551 ms) was faster than for 
Sad targets (M = 565; Mdiff  =  -14.24). However theses effects were not present 
in the State, Trait or Depression groups (Figures 7 and 8)  
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Table 7. Comparison of Means and Standard Deviations  
 
  
 
 
 
Table 8. Comparison of Effects 
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 Data from these within-group analyses (Figure 6) also suggest that RTs 
were generally longer to both happy and sad targets in these groups compared 
with the control group (Figures 7 and 8). To test whether the within group 
condition RTs of control were significantly shorter than those of state, trait or 
depression; we compared the conditional means of the control group to the other 
three groups, using a student’s t-test (Table 9).  
 
Table 9. Comparison of Conditions for Control vs. State, Trait, or Depression. 
 
 
 
Results (Table 9) confirmed that the state group’s RTs (M =  were significantly 
slower than the control group for happy targets when near (Congruent: t(65) = 
2.34, p = .022; ☺☺☺, Incongruent: t(65) = 2.39, p = .020; ☺), and when far 
(Congruent: t(65) = 2.48, p = .016; ☺  ☺  ☺, Incongruent: t(65) = 2.16, p = .034;   
☺  ). When the state group viewed sad targets, they were also significantly 
slower than control in response to far congruent distractors (t(65) = 2.03, p = .046; 
    ). However, no other sad conditions for state, or any happy or sad 
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condition for trait or depression groups differed from the control group 
significantly.  
These results indicate that while the groups were able to correctly identify 
whether a face was happy or sad, the high state anxiety group was affected by 
both the positive and the negative emotionality of the target to a greater extent 
than controls (Figures 7 and 8). Since RTs were greater to happy and sad targets 
in the high state anxiety group compared to controls, it seems that this group was 
affected by emotionality to a greater degree than the controls. They did not show 
a Target effect (i.e., state were not more significantly affected by negative than 
positive targets). The controls were more affected by negative than by positive 
targets (Tables 7 and 8).  
Distance: There was a significant difference between near and far distance 
conditions for the Control (F(1, 32) = 54.31, p < .001, ηp2 = .63), State (F(1, 32) = 
43.38, p < .001, ηp2 = .58), Trait (F(1, 32) = 42.56, p < .001, ηp2 = .57), and 
Depression (F(1, 32) = 44.95, p < .001, ηp2 = .58) groups (Table 4). RTs for 
distractors in the Near position were faster than in the Far position for the Control 
(Near: M =549, Far: M = 567, Mdiff  =  -17.78), State (Near: M = 596, Far: M = 
611, Mdiff  =  -15.21),  Trait (Near: M = 565, Far: M = 579, Mdiff  =  -14.41), and 
Depression (Near: M = 570, Far: M = 585, Mdiff  =  -14.34) groups. These data 
indicate that State, Trait and Depression groups were able to correctly identify 
whether a distractor face was close to or far from the target face. They processed 
the distance locations uniquely, mirroring the Control group (Tables 7 and 8). 
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Congruency: There was a significant Congruency effect in RTs for the Control 
(F(2, 64) = 20.37, p < .001, ηp2 = .39), State (F(2, 64) = 14.47, p < .001, ηp2 = .31), 
Trait (F(2, 64) = 9.14, p < .001, ηp2 = .22), and Depression (F(2, 64) = 11.64, p < .001, 
ηp2 = .27) groups (Table 4). In the Control group, RTs when distractors were 
Congruent (M = 551) with the target were faster than when distractors were 
Neutral (M = 556; Mdiff  =  -5.65) or Incongruent  (M = 568, Mdiff  =  -16.89), and 
RTs for the Neutral condition were faster than for  Incongruent (Mdiff  =  -11.24) 
condition. In State, Trait and Depression groups, there were no significant 
differences between the Congruent and Neutral conditions. But RTs to 
Congruent trials were faster than RTs to Incongruent trials in State (Congruent: 
M = 597, Incongruent: M = 614, Mdiff  =  -16.72),  Trait (Congruent: M = 566, 
Incongruent: M = 580, , Mdiff  =  -14.69), and Depression (Congruent: M = 572, 
Incongruent: M = 586, , Mdiff  =  -13.84) groups. In addition, RTs were faster under 
the Neutral condition than the Incongruent condition for State (Neutral: M = 600, 
Mdiff  =  -13.72),  Trait (Neutral: M = 570, Mdiff  =  -10.28), and Depression (Neutral: 
M = 575, Mdiff  =  -11.44) groups. These data indicate that, comparable to healthy 
participants, State, Trait and Depression groups distinguished between 
congruent and incongruent conditions. However, unlike the healthy participants, 
these groups were not sensitive to the distinction between congruent and neutral 
conditions (Tables 7 and 8). 
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Interactions of Congruency with Distance and Target 
To determine whether scope of attention varied by type of target (i.e., 
happy or sad) or degree of distance (i.e., near or far), the interactions between 
congruency, distance, and target emotionality were considered.  Again, 
congruency effects are broad Attentional Scope Effects (ASE), and no 
congruency effect is a narrow ASE. ASE types are categorize as :  
advantageous, when they are the same as the control group, for that condition, 
or effect,  or disadvantageous if different than the control group.  
Results indicated that the control and state groups showed a broad ASE 
(i.e., a congruency effect) for both near and far conditions with happy targets. 
Trait and depression, however, showed a narrow ASE (i.e., no congruency 
effect) in the near condition with happy targets and a broad ASE in the far 
condition with happy targets. All groups showed a narrow ASE when viewing Sad 
targets at any distance, except for state anxiety in the sad, far, and congruent 
condition, when compared to the control group (Table 9) (See Effects of Mood on 
Attentional Scope, Healthy Controls and State Anxiety, para. 2) 
These data show the state, trait and depression groups have the ability to 
perceive the same amount of stimuli as the control group when viewing negative 
items, at any distance, and when viewing positive items from afar. But when 
focusing on near, happy items, trait and depression perceive significantly less 
stimuli than the Control group (Figure 19).  
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Figure 19. Mood Group Congruency and Attentional Scope Effects by Distance.  
(A) Congruency effects (CE; significant difference marked with ‘*’ between C; 
congruent = dark grey, and I; incongruent = light gray) per mood group for Near 
or Far. Broad ASE = CE, Narrow ASE = No CE. (B) Attentional scope effects. 
Congruency effect and RT variance with control group compared to either state, 
trait or depression group. Data from Table 4, 7 & 8; confidence intervals = .95. 
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CHAPTER SIX:  
DISCUSSION 
 
The measurement of congruency effects, in the near and far locations, 
allowed us to evaluate the scope of attention for those with and without clinical 
mood symptomology. All groups showed a narrowed ASE (scope of attention) 
with sad targets regardless of whether distractors were in close proximity to the 
target or were relatively distant from the target. Thus, when viewing negative 
targets, the state, trait and depression groups demonstrated the same narrowed 
scope of attention as the control group, and this was the case regardless of the 
distracter location.  
When viewing positive targets, we found that the scope of attention for the 
state group was broad, like the control group. But in trait and depression, the 
scope of attention was narrow (Figure 20). 
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Figure 20. Hypothesized Compared to Experimental Outcomes.   
(A) Hypothesized results per literary findings (Reprint: Figure 9). (B) 
Experimental results. State: Prolonged RT to emotional stimuli, no ASE 
difference to control group, but loss of target effect. Trait and depression: No RT 
difference to emotional stimuli, but ASE narrow to happy targets and loss of 
target effect. ASE: Attentional Scope Effect, ☺ = Happy or ☺ = Sad target, 
elongated face = broad ASE, round face = narrow ASE.  
 
We utilized the distance variable to plot the near and far congruencies 
within each mood group, then examined the distances with a congruency effect 
(i.e., a broad Attentional Scope Effect; ASE), and those without a congruency 
effect (i.e., a narrow ASE) (Figure 21). 
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Figure 21. Comparison of Mood Group Congruency by Distance. 
Happy target only, *CE: I = Incongruent minus C = Congruent. 
 
 The state, trait and depression groups’ ASEs were comparable to those 
for the control group when the distractors were in the far location (i.e., Broad 
ASEs are reflected in a congruency effect at that distance location). However, 
when distractors were in close proximity to a positive target, the control and state 
groups showed a broad attentional scope while the trait and depression groups 
showed a narrowed attentional scope (Figure 21).  Thus, the state group does 
not differ from the control group in terms of attentional scope (i.e., the state and 
control groups show a congruency effect to positive targets and no congruency 
effect to sad targets, regardless of the distractors’ degree of proximity to the 
target). Therefore, the same amount of emotional information is entering 
perception for state anxiolytics and health controls.  
By contrast, the trait and depression groups differ from the control and 
state groups in their ASE response to happy targets when distractors are in close 
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proximity to the target. Therefore, although the trait and depression groups mirror 
the control and state groups narrow ASEs when sad targets distractors are at 
any proximity to the target, and mirror broad ASEs to happy targets when 
distractors are far from the target, once the target is happy, and near, the trait 
and depression groups show a narrow ASE (Figure 21). Said differently, when 
salient-emotions are geographically close to positive stimuli, trait and depression 
show no congruency effect. Therefore, a different amount of emotional 
information (i.e., less data) is entering the perception of  trait anxiety and  
depressives than state anxiety or healthy controls (Figure 22). 
 
 
Figure 22. Comparison of Mood-group Perception – Happy, Near. 
Trait and depression perceive less emotional stimuli during happy targets with 
nearby, salient emotional stimuli than healthy controls or state anxiolytics. Top 
faces = salient emotions perceived, C = congruent, I = incongruent. *Congruency 
effect (CE) = broad ASE. No CE = Narrow ASE. 
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Why is it that high trait individuals and depressives show no congruency 
effect to happy targets under the near distractor condition but do show a 
congruency effect to happy faces under the far distractor condition? This is a 
more complicated question. First, in evaluating the far condition, the presence of 
a Broad ASE in the happy targets far distractor condition seems to reflect that 
those with trait anxiety and depression have a decreased capacity to inhibit 
processing of non-adjacent irrelevant information (i.e., one can’t help but see the 
far distractors) (Rowe, Hirsh, & Anderson, 2007). This simply indicates that 
depressives and trait anxiolytics are like healthy controls in having a broad 
attentional scope to happy stimuli, and can identify the emotionality of the 
changing distractors when they are at a distance from their focus. (i.e., they can 
correctly evaluate non-focused-upon’ emotional information). This allows the 
evaluation of many items in the environment; an advantage when approaching 
other humans. Second, the presence of a Narrow ASE in the happy target, near 
condition could reflect an increased capacity to inhibit processing of spatially 
adjacent irrelevant information. But why would depressive and trait anxiolytics 
have greater inhibitory capabilities than health controls? It may be that these 
mood disorders involve some kind of difficulty with controlling attention to 
emotionally salient targets when distractors of any kind are in close proximity. 
This would constitute a lack of control over attentional processes when emotion 
is involved. Whether the target is happy or sad, these individuals may tend to 
narrow their focus when distractors are in close proximity to the target. This is 
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supported by the loss of target effects for trait anxiety and depression seen in 
Table 6. This could be a reaction to being over stimulated (i.e., overexertion of 
the normal cyclical, repetitive mechanisms of thought) by the emotionality of 
multiple closely-spaced targets (i.e., making the issue an inability to process any 
emotional stimuli when near, not an issue with a specific emotion, or emotional 
salience).   
Prediction versus Outcome 
Replication of Previous Findings  
Our first hypothesis concerned the replication of standard effects 
previously found in the literature. This successful replication established the 
current sample of control group participants to be typical of samples previously 
employed in the literature. Therefore, we established the external validity of the 
following findings: healthy controls showed target effects (i.e., happy had faster 
mean RTs than sad), distance effects (i.e., near was responded to faster than 
far) and congruency effects (i.e., congruent was responded to faster than 
Incongruent). Additionally, a congruency effect was present for happy targets, but 
not for sad targets, such that the control group showed broad attentional scope 
effects (ASE; i.e., where there is a congruency effect present) during 
presentation of happy targets in the near condition. We had presented an 
additional, conditional hypothesis, that we may see broad ASEs in the happy 
target, far condition. Although there is less previous research on the distance by 
congruency interaction, the available findings are consistent with the presence of 
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a congruency effect. Indeed we found congruency effects in the happy far 
condition. These findings support our assertion that the control group is 
representative of the larger, healthy population. 
Effects of Mood on Attentional Scope 
Healthy Controls and State Anxiety.  We hypothesized that the healthy 
controls and state anxiety would show target effects, distance effects, and 
congruency effects. Distance and congruency effects were found in state anxiety, 
but target effects were not present (Table 6). This unexpected loss of emotional 
differentiation and its effect on the ASE, will be expanded upon below (see Loss 
of the Target Effect). We hypothesized that there would be a congruency effect 
for happy targets but not for sad targets. That is, controls and state would show 
broad ASEs during presentation of happy targets in the near, and possibly far 
conditions, but those ASEs may be significantly slower than the control groups.  
These expected congruency effects were confirmed for both sad and 
happy targets in both the near and far conditions. RTs to happy targets with 
distractors in the near and far conditions occurred significantly slower than for the 
control group (Figure 19). Response to sad targets with congruent distractors, at 
the far distance (i.e.,     ), were also significantly slower than the control 
group (Table 9). Congruent sad is the most negative condition, used herein, and 
no other such significant results were found for trait or depression (when 
compared to control). Therefore, these data suggests that state sufferers are 
highly biased toward negative or fear items (Table 9). 
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Healthy Controls and Trait Anxiety. We hypothesized that the healthy 
controls and trait anxiety groups would show target effects, distance effects, and 
congruency effects. Distance and congruency effects were found in trait anxiety, 
but target effects were not (See Loss of the Target Effect) (Table 6). Congruency 
effects were hypothesized to be obtained for happy targets but not for sad 
targets. That is, it was expected that controls and trait anxiolytics would show 
broad ASEs during presentation of happy targets in the near, and possibly the 
far, conditions.  
Congruency effects for sad targets, at any distance, and for happy targets 
at the far distractor-distance, were confirmed. However, predictions for the trait 
group’s response to happy targets in the near location were not confirmed 
(Figure 19). We reasoned that the trait group’s enhanced recognition for faces 
would result in the retention of a broad ASE even in the presence of decreased 
inhibition to negative distractors. However, we were incorrect in our assertion. It 
seems that the reduced inhibition to negative distractors for those who 
experience trait anxiety is a stronger influence on the modulation of the ASE than 
enhanced recognition for faces. Another intervening factor could be that the 
enhanced recognition for emotional faces is stronger for sad than happy faces, 
leaving, happy targets to be overwhelmed by negative emotional distractions. 
Additionally, we predicted that the RT for those ASEs would be no different than 
the control groups; this was confirmed by the data (Table 9). 
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Healthy Controls and Depression. We hypothesized that the healthy 
controls and the depression group would show target effects and distance 
effects, but would differ in regard to congruency effects. Distance effects were 
found for the depressives, but not target effects (see Loss of the Target Effect) 
(Table 6). In addition, and as predicted, the groups showed different congruency 
effects. That is, no congruency effects were expected in the depression group for 
happy targets or for sad targets, and, with the exception of happy targets in the 
far condition, none were found. It had been hypothesized that depression would 
result in a narrow ASE  in near and possibly far conditions due to the inability to 
inhibit negative distractors. This was confirmed to be true. The RTs to happy and 
sad targets were also hypothesized to be significantly slower than for the control 
group. However, this was not the case (Table 9). This may be explained by the 
fact that a narrow ASE for depressives equated to ‘perceiving no distractors’ or 
‘perceiving the target only’.   
Effect Loss 
Loss of Targets Effect.  Loss of target effects were found in the state 
anxiety, trait anxiety, and depression groups (Table 6). Target effects are an 
inherent human survival mechanism which are evident in RT differences between 
responding to a positive or a negative emotional target (i.e., happy faces are 
responded to faster than sad faces in healthy individuals). Therefore, loss of a 
target-effect is essentially a reduction in the ability to distinguish emotional 
stimuli. Loss of target effects illustrates that the brain’s emotional processing 
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centers (i.e., ACC/MCC) are unable to formulate unique, emotion-related, 
responses. However, each participant in the state, trait and depression groups 
correctly identified whether a target face was happy or sad (i.e., each subject’s 
accuracy score was no less than 30% below the mean accuracy score of that 
condition). This data shows evidence that the state, trait and depression subjects’ 
brains have the ability to perceive whether a target is exhibiting the emotions of 
happy or sad. Therefore, at least a portion of the brains emotional processing 
centers are working in state, trait and depression groups. 
Loss of the Distractor’s Effect. Distinction of distractors plays an integral 
part in the measurement of the ASE. Distractor differentiation is seen in the 
congruency effect (see Table 6, Congruency row for congruency per mood group 
and Figures 21 and 22 for distractors loss per mood group). In the case of un-
perceived distractors, the mind does not place them into memory (Heurley, & 
Ferrier, 2015; Martin, 1992; Mitterer, Horschig, Müsseler, & Majid, 2009).  
Therefore, these data reveal that trait anxiolytics and depressives’ 
perception of the emotional-world (i.e., their ‘map-of-life’ or their overall 
experience of the moment) is significantly different than those in the control 
group and state anxiety group (Figure 22). This suggests that small group social 
interaction, which occurs in almost every moment of work, school, or home life, 
would have missing data for trait anxiolytics and depressives; data which healthy 
brains readily perceive.  
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This missing data would pertain to any emotional content that is not in 
one’s specific focus, at a given moment. Evaluating the emotional saliency of a 
group has been hard-wired into the human brain, Therefore, the exclusion of 
group emotional dynamics alters the assessment of the human environment, the 
perception of one’s future in that environment, and the way humans perceive 
ongoing human emotional-interactions. In short, the loss of perception of 
emotional distractors alters the human experience and expectations of our 
ongoing emotional-place in society. 
Loss of the Attentional Scope’s Effect. Happy emotionally-salient 
encounters tend to intensify at close range (i.e., when other humans are near). 
‘Near’ interactions are found in most interpersonal settings (i.e., at work, with 
friends), and it is these interactions that would be the most necessary to 
build/maintain positive social-emotional effects both in society and in the 
individual. However, Trait and Depression showed a narrowed ASE in response 
to positive stimuli with near distractors (Figure 21 and 22). This would indicate 
that those with Trait anxiety or Depression could not accurately distinguish the 
current group’s emotional changes. Without the ability to process small group 
interactions, a human would be unable to adapt to social changes. 
Implications of the Mood Driven Attentional Scope 
Perceiving the Negative  
The mood-driven scope of attention has implications during social 
interactions; some are advantageous, and some detrimental. Socially, a narrow 
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ASE, when focusing on a negative (i.e. sad or dangerous) target, at any distance, 
is an advantageous, survival-based response (Coon, & Mitterer, 2008; Smith, 
Seger, & Mackie, 2007). Negative items need to be scrutinized for their level of 
threat in an on-going and preferential manner, and the brain tries to assure that 
distractions are not permitted (Kolb, & Whishaw, 2015; Stöttinger, & Perner, 
2006). Healthy control, state and trail anxiety and depression participants 
responded in this adaptive manner to sad targets, with one exception: State 
anxiety, with sad targets having far, congruent distractors (Table 9). 
The data suggests that when state anxiolytics view a sad target, with far 
away emotional distractors, their ASE broadens when compared to control (Table 
9). This is a reversal of the advantageous ASE narrowing seen in all other groups 
during sad items of focus. To investigate this conditional event, we evaluated the 
ASE of each condition, separately (Table 10). 
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Table 10. Perception of Stimuli (A) by Mood Group (B-E) 
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These data (Figure 10) reveal some interesting differences between the 
ASEs and therefore the perception of emotional stimuli of all groups. Firstly, 
these data reflects that the tenants of attentional control to sad stimuli are being 
utilized in a beneficial and survival-prone manner by trait and depression (Figure 
19 and the non-significant results in Table 9). Examples of this could range from 
a bear in the woods to approaching a friend who responds with a frown; both 
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inform human survival needs (Brosch, Pourtois, Sander, & Vuilleumier, 2011; 
Graziano, 2014; Sander, & Vuilleumier, 2011). The same was true of the state 
group, but with one exception: sad target, far distractor, congruent condition (i.e., 
    ; Table 9; state column). This bias for the highly negative, emotion-based 
stimuli cannot be categorized as a healthy, or as an advantageous attentional 
mechanism.  
Secondly, compared to the RTs of all other groups, the state groups sad, 
far, congruent RTs, are extremely slow (M = 612), compared to control (M = 
571), or trait (M = 576) or depression (M = 586) (Table 7). This indicates the state 
anxiety group is spending a large amount of neural effort observing the sad, far, 
congruent condition. The interesting portion of this occurrence is that the state 
participants are only experiencing this slowing when the distractors are far from 
the target. Therefore, as seen in trait and depressions inability to evaluate near 
emotional saliency of a happy targets distractors when they are in close prolixity 
to the target-emotion, we see states inability to ‘disengage’ or perhaps ’efficiently 
process’  sad target when sad distractors are at a distance.   
Even though the state group should have a narrow ASE, and only 
perceive the sad emotional stimuli, the state group perceives a difference in the 
sad targets congruent condition (Table 9). However, there was no significant 
difference between sad, far incongruent in state vs. control (Table 9; last 2 rows), 
and state had no congruency effect for the sad far condition (Figures 21 and 22). 
This implies that the state group did not perceive a difference in the sad 
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incongruent distractors over any other sad target congruencies, at any distance. 
This data examples, with the exception of the sad, far, congruent condition, that 
the state brain perceived all other sad target distance congruencies with a narrow 
ASE (i.e., the advantageous, survival-based awareness, limited to the perception 
of  only the danger target , and excluding distractors).  
Lastly, the state groups sad, far, congruent, broad ASE also implies that 
the state group recognized the distractor-type (i.e., negative), at a particular 
distance (i.e., far), during a time when the brain should have activated the fear 
response, triggering a narrow ASE to inhibit distractors and increase survival 
during danger. For state, this broad ASE is a complete divergence from a healthy 
scope of attention during sad emotional stimuli (i.e., the ASE should be narrow). 
The consequences of this ASE reversal would evidence in a heightened 
perception of fear items in the environment. Said differently, where state should 
advantageously focus on the one threat item (i.e.,), this disadvantageously 
broad ASE would, instead, force processing of all items (i.e., ) during the 
most neurologically taxing distance, far (i.e.,     ). 
Functionally, these data would have the real-world consequence of 
perceiving a higher amount of danger than other groups (i.e., a group of people 
frowning may seem like anger, or seeing joggers approach may be identified as 
‘intent to harm’). Therefore, state anxiolytics may exhibit the same behavioral 
markers of social withdrawal or isolation as seen in depression, but for a different 
reason. If every slightly negative group viewed from afar was perceived as high 
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danger, no one would approach a social gathering. Furthermore, because the 
enhanced fear is occurring at a far distance, state anxiety sufferers would have 
motivation to flee, not approach and reassess.  
Therefore, where intimate social conversations are hard for trait and 
depression to decipher, state individuals would not get to the intimate 
conversation stage as they would self-isolate for protection.  
Perceiving the Positive  
Socially, a broad  ASE, when focusing on a positive (i.e. happy or safe) 
target, at any distance, is an advantageous, survival-based response (Coon, & 
Mitterer, 2008; Smith, Seger, & Mackie, 2007). 
All groups showed a broad scope of attention to happy targets, when 
competing emotional information in distractor faces was distant from the target. 
The analogous real life situation might be if your friend, the item of focus, 
displays a happy facial expression, but those at other tables are clearly sad or 
angry, suggesting that the happy display you are engaged in may be 
‘inappropriate for the circumstances’. The mood disorders studied here appear to 
have a comparable level of sensitivity (to healthy individuals) when the target is 
happy (i.e., is safe) and the emotional salience is far away. Here, the scope of 
attention allows recognition that the surrounding environment has become 
negative, and the ability to immediately recognize that change is imperative to 
survival.  
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An interesting, and perhaps puzzling aspect of these results is that once 
groups were viewing a happy target in the near condition, these groups displayed 
some drastic changes.  The control group and the state group, with broad ASEs, 
could discern similarities or differences between target and distractor emotional 
displays, but the Trait and Depression groups displayed narrow ASEs, and could 
not.  
A broad scope of attention brings with it the ability to differentiate among 
the emotional states within a group of individuals (Barratt & Bundesen, 2012; 
Diéguez-Risco, Aguado, Albert, & Hinojosa, 2015; Kanske & Kotz, 2011). 
Humans spend their lives evaluating other humans’ emotional output for possible 
signs of danger/no-danger so that the appropriate social interaction can 
commence (i.e., are they happy to see me, scared of me, might yell at me?). 
Without the ability to emotionally gauge our environment, quickly and accurately, 
from afar (i.e. an ability all the groups have) and then confirm our environmental 
state when near (i.e., an ability which trait and depression don’t have), our 
chances for physical, social, and emotional survival are decreased.  In fact, one 
could argue, that the evaluation of the emotional variance of those humans 
nearest to you is the most important aspect of survival. The ones nearest you 
could pose the most danger. Therefore, those without the ability to assess 
emotions in the happy, near condition, could be most vulnerable to physical, 
emotional, psychological harm in our society.  
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Functioning With a Mood Disorder 
These data reflect that functioning with a mood disorder means 
functioning at a disadvantage when perceiving emotion. The state group is 
functioning perceptually like the control group (i.e., has comparably, broad ASEs, 
in the happy target near congruencies), just less efficiently responding. An 
example of how this might evidence in a state anxiolytic is that they might be 
slow to perceive when others are upset (i.e., whether the upset person is focus of 
their attention, or part of the group dynamic). We could assume that taking 
significantly longer to process emotional information on an ongoing basis could 
be social deemed as being mean, unfeeling toward others emotional states, or 
allow the individual to take too long to interpret a negative emotional situation to 
the point that their survival is in peril. 
Those who have, trait anxiety and depression would have difficulties 
‘reading the room’ so to speak in close interactions. They would be unable to 
gauge the emotionality of a small group (i.e., only divining the emotionality of the 
focus of their attention). This would make it harder to function in social, business, 
and family setting where the social system includes concurrent interactions with 
multiple emotional states (i.e., every situation). A simple example could be a trait 
anxiolytic or depressive individual watching a video and is unable to process the 
happy or annoyed motion exhibited in their spouse.  
The trait anxiety and depressive groups show that they are not responding 
differently (i.e., significantly slower) than the control group, but, depressives 
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mirror traits ‘inability to gauge the emotionality of a group’  (i.e., they have the 
same narrow attentional scope in the happy near condition).Both depression and 
trait have a decreased ability to limit negative distractors, which creates an 
inability to decipher emotion in a group setting, and may explain the depressed 
symptomology related to the withdrawal from social function; as exerting  energy 
and still not be able to process the emotions of multiple people at once, would 
create a large neural load. However, it does not explain the mechanism in trait 
anxiolytics who do not exhibit social withdrawal. 
These results suggest that state anxiolytics are relatively slower in 
responding to emotional information in a facial stimulus. Once they identify the 
face as sad at far range, they experience a broad ASE and a heightened fear 
response. Once they identify the face as happy at close range, they achieve the 
same, broad, scope of attention as healthy individuals. By contrast, once 
depressives and trait anxiolytics identify a positive emotional expression, they are 
restricted in their ability to recognize contrasting or changing expressions in 
individuals who are in close proximity to their focus of attention. Depressives and 
individuals with high trait anxiety have a relatively narrower SoA, restricting their 
perception of close-range emotional-interactions. The present findings indicate 
that individuals with mood disorders process emotional information differently 
than healthy individuals. 
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Conclusion 
In conclusion, the findings of this study show that the attentional scope 
effect is a behavioral-marker of distinct mood disorders; even in a comorbid 
environment. Therefore, these data provide evidence that the scope of attention’s 
modulation can be utilized to ascertain if each, individual, mood-disorder is 
present, even in the presence of other, highly correlated mood-disorders.  
Furthermore, these data provide evidence that those suffering disorders of 
mood exhibit a disadvantageous modulation their scope of attention during 
emotional interactions. As the scope of attention sets the limits of visual 
emotional perception, the data suggests humans with mood-disorders perceive 
the emotional world differently than those without a mood-disorder.    
Limitations 
The first limitation was sample size. A larger sample size would allow a 
greater number of high scorers, allowing the inclusion of mood-groups with 
higher mean scores, and providing a larger differentiation between groups. The 
second limitation may have been comorbidities between mood-groups. 
Evaluating groups without mood comorbidities may allow a more realistic 
correlation of the effect of mood on attentional scope. However, the goal of this 
study was to identify if the attentional scope effected real-life emotional 
perception during mood. With high comorbidity a reality in the human populous, 
the concern may be mute, and perhaps studies containing mood-comorbidities 
should be the norm (i.e., analyzed as depression + trait level, depression + state 
 
92 
 
level, etc. The third limitation is the ‘unforeseen interaction’; an undefined 
mediator or moderator may be present (i.e., effecting mood vs. the scope of 
attention), making these results not solely attributable to the ASE.  
Future Research 
It has been suggested that attention deficits may precede the emergence 
of mood-disorders (Leppänen, 2006), suggesting that those at risk for developing 
a disorder of mood may present with the same biases in attention and attentional 
scope inherent to diagnosed individuals. Therefore, future research should focus 
on the neuroimaging of human patients using a target-distractor with distance 
task to compare attentional scope effects with brain size in those with or without 
diagnosed mood disorders. Brain size is a biological marker, or biomarker, of a 
current or possible mood-disorder, therefore, attentional scope abnormalities 
may correlate as a behavioral marker of mood-disorders.  
Additionally, future research should focus on a substituting a behavioral-
marker for the current first-line pharmacological interventions though 
computational behavioral tasks. Medical diagnostic process for most patients 
includes answering limited questions or expressing an interpretation of their own 
symptomology. Due to co-morbid symptomology throughout mood-disorders 
(Spielberger, et, al., 1983; Vitasari, et al., 2011; Yang, et al., 2016), the physician 
then prescribes the ‘best’ pharmacology for the expressed symptomology (i.e., I 
feel sleepy, I feel anxious, I don’t like to do things anymore). This leads to high 
misdiagnosis and low symptomology resolution on the 1st medication prescribed. 
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Therefore, future research should investigate the creation of a shortened 
computational intervention during the patient’s waiting room time to help target 
the pharmacology or other intervention prescribed. This would also allow real-
time tracking of the patients ASE with an effective, statistical correlation of mood-
behavioral-data. This illuminates the possibility of medical intervention before a 
transient mood-variance becomes a pathological mood-disorder (i.e., something 
not available at this time).  
A longitudinal study in a medically-based facility, where healthy controls, 
pre-diagnosed, possible misdiagnosed, and post diagnosed individuals could 
repeat the task over a period of years could investigate the ASE over time in 
healthy vs. mood-disordered groups.  The attentional scope differences could be 
tracked and correlated to the expression, progression, or resolutions of disease 
symptomology. The benefit would be to advance our understanding of the normal 
scope of attention, and/or normal perception-differences over the lifetime  
Lastly, future research should allocate focus to those within the Autism 
Spectrum population. Autisms social-emotional and functional aspects are 
complex. One of the most severe barriers to quality of life and social interaction is 
the autistic propensity to withdraw from human interaction, while leaning toward 
non-human interaction (i.e., choosing to interact with a cell phone or computer 
over a person). This creates a divide which prohibits that patient, their family, and 
medical professionals from understanding what the autistic spectrum patient 
perceives or how their perception of an event may differ from the non-autistic 
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population. Therefore, the future application of this paradigm to those within the 
autism spectrum may allow non-autistics to glimpse perceptual differences 
leading to more targeted or more effective therapies for those with autism.  
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APPENDIX A: 
INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD (IRB) APPROVAL 
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APPENDIX B: 
STATE-TRAIT ANXIETY INVENTORY - TRAIT (STAI-T) 
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STAI-T  
Participant instructions: Below is a list of statements which can be used to 
describe how people feel.  Beside each statement are four numbers which 
indicate the degree with which each statement is self-descriptive of your mood in 
general (e.g., 1 = not at all, 2 = a little, 3 = moderately, 4 = very much so). Please 
read each statement carefully and circle the number which best indicates how 
you feel in general, or over the last 1 to 2 weeks. 
 
1-------------------------------2-------------------------------3---------------------------------4  
Not at all                   A Little                         Moderately           Very Much So 
 
Questions: 
1. My heart beats fast. 
2. My muscles are tense.  
3. I feel agonized over my problems. 
4. I think that others won’t approve of me.   
5. I feel like I’m missing out on things because I can’t make up my mind soon 
enough.  
6. I feel dizzy. 
7. My muscles feel weak.  
8. I feel trembly and shaky. 
9. I picture some future misfortune.  
10. I can’t get some thought out of my mind.  
11. I have trouble remembering things.  
12. My face feels hot. 
13. I think that the worst will happen. 
14. My arms and legs feel stiff.  
15. My throat feels dry.  
16. I keep busy to avoid uncomfortable thoughts.  
17. I cannot concentrate without irrelevant thoughts intruding.  
18. My breathing is fast and shallow.  
19. I worry that I cannot control my thoughts as well as I would like to.  
20. I have butterflies in the stomach. 
21. My palms feel clammy. 
 
(Spielberger, 1972; Spielberger, Gorsuch, Lushene, Vagg, & Jacobs, 1983) 
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APPENDIX C: 
STATE-TRAIT ANXIETY INVENTORY - STATE (STAI-S) 
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STAI-S 
Participant instructions: Below is a list of statements which can be used to 
describe how people feel.  Beside each statement are four numbers which 
indicate the degree with which each statement is self-descriptive of mood at this 
moment (e.g., 1 = not at all, 2 = a little, 3 = moderately, 4 = very much so). 
Please read each statement carefully and circle the number which best indicates 
how you feel right now, at this very moment, even if this is not how you usually 
feel. 
 
1-------------------------------2-------------------------------3---------------------------------4  
Not at all                  A Little                          Moderately           Very Much So 
 
Questions: 
1. My heart beats fast. 
2. My muscles are tense.  
3. I feel agonized over my problems. 
4. I think that others won’t approve of me.   
5. I feel like I’m missing out on things because I can’t make up my mind soon 
enough.  
6. I feel dizzy. 
7. My muscles feel weak.  
8. I feel trembly and shaky. 
9. I picture some future misfortune.  
10. I can’t get some thought out of my mind.  
11. I have trouble remembering things.  
12. My face feels hot. 
13. I think that the worst will happen. 
14. My arms and legs feel stiff.  
15. My throat feels dry.  
16. I keep busy to avoid uncomfortable thoughts.  
17. I cannot concentrate without irrelevant thoughts intruding.  
18. My breathing is fast and shallow.  
19. I worry that I cannot control my thoughts as well as I would like to.  
20. I have butterflies in the stomach. 
21. My palms feel clammy. 
 
(Spielberger, 1972; Spielberger, Gorsuch, Lushene, Vagg, & Jacobs, 1983) 
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APPENDIX D: 
CENTER FOR EPIDEMIOLOGICAL STUDIES DEPRESSION SCALE (CESD) 
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CESD 
Participant instructions: You will be shown a list of some ways you may have felt 
or behaved. Please indicate how often you have felt this way during the last week 
by selecting the appropriate response.  
 
1------------------------------2---------------------3---------------------------------------4  
Rarely    Some     Occasionally   Most 
or none           or a little      or a moderate amount  or all 
of the time         of the time        of time                            of the time 
(less than 1 day)   (1-2 days)     (3-4 days)                (5-7 days) 
                                                                             
Questions: 
1. I was bothered by things that usually don't bother me 
2. I did not feel like eating; my appetite was poor 
3. I felt that I could not shake off the blues even with help from my family or 
friends 
4. I felt I was just as good as other people 
5. I had trouble keeping my mind on what I was doing 
6. I felt depressed 
7. I felt that everything I did was an effort 
8. I felt hopeful about the future 
9. I thought my life had been a failure 
10. I felt fearful 
11. My sleep was restless 
12. I was happy 
13. I talked less than usual 
14. I felt lonely 
15. People were unfriendly 
16. I enjoyed life 
17. I had crying spells 
18. I felt sad 
19. I felt that people disliked me 
20. I could not get going 
 
 
(Radloff, 1977)
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